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GPS AND CELL PHONE TRACKING OF EMPLOYEES 
Marc Chase McAllister* 
Abstract 
 
This Article examines employee location tracking through smart phone 
apps and GPS devices attached to or embedded within an employee’s 
personal or company vehicle. For each form of tracking, this Article provides 
separate frameworks for employers to follow when conducting individual 
employee misconduct investigations and when tracking an entire group of 
employees for non-investigatory purposes. Beginning with GPS tracking for 
individual misconduct investigations, this Article contends that such 
tracking should be used only as a means to corroborate evidence that an 
employee has committed a terminable offense, that an employer may resort 
to this technique only after alternative investigative methods fail to generate 
enough evidence to warrant disciplinary action, and that the tracking must 
cease once the alleged wrongdoing has been corroborated. Turning to non-
investigatory forms of GPS tracking, such as the monitoring of an 
employer’s entire fleet of taxi-cab or rideshare drivers, this Article proposes 
that such tracking should be performed only for legitimate business purposes 
and only if employees consent to the tracking in advance. Whether 
performed for investigatory or non-investigatory purposes, this Article 
further proposes that employers should avoid collecting GPS tracking data 
while employees are off-duty. Finally, this Article addresses employee 
tracking through smart phone apps, including employer-owned apps and 
apps designed for time-keeping purposes. Because employees who use such 
apps typically consent to the monitoring of their phone’s location, this 
Article concludes that employees tracked in this manner cannot reasonably 
expect privacy in such monitoring. As a result, this Article predicts that app-
based employee tracking will not trigger Fourth Amendment protection, nor 
will it be sufficient to sustain a privacy-related tort claim, such that 
employers will typically not face civil liability for tracking employees 
through smart phone apps.  
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INTRODUCTION 
This Article examines modern forms of location tracking by 
employers, including the tracking of employees through GPS devices and 
smartphone apps.  
The starting point to this Article’s analysis is the established law 
governing GPS tracking by law enforcement. In that context, the United 
States Supreme Court recently ruled that the Fourth Amendment applies 
when police attach a GPS tracking device to a criminal suspect’s vehicle 
and use the device to monitor the vehicle’s movements.1 In effect, this 
ruling established that when GPS tracking is conducted as part of a 
criminal investigation, the procedure must be authorized by a warrant or 
warrant exception.2  
Like law enforcement officials, public employers must abide by the 
Fourth Amendment,3 and private employers may be liable in tort for 
invading an employee’s reasonable expectation of privacy, a concept 
borrowed from Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.4 Yet the Fourth 
Amendment framework that governs employers differs somewhat from 
                                                                                                                     
 1. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012).  
 2.  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (“‘Over and again this Court has 
emphasized that’ . . . searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by 
judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few 
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” (footnote omitted) (quoting United 
States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951))).  
 3. See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725 (1987). 
 4. See infra notes 102–04 and accompanying text. 
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that which governs law enforcement. In the employment context, 
employee investigations must generally be both reasonable at the 
inception and reasonable in scope,5 which is the usual framework for 
cases that fall outside the criminal investigation context.6  
Applying Fourth Amendment law as it pertains to employers, this 
Article considers both GPS tracking for purposes of investigating 
individual employee misconduct via a surreptitiously installed tracking 
device, and GPS tracking of an entire segment of employees via GPS 
devices that have been preinstalled in employer-owned vehicles.  
Regarding individual misconduct investigations, this Article proposes 
that an employer may track an employee through a GPS device installed 
on the employee’s personal or employer-owned vehicle only in very 
narrow circumstances. In particular, this Article proposes that this 
procedure be used only when the employer has reason to believe such 
tracking would corroborate evidence that an employee has committed a 
terminable offense, and only after alternative methods of investigation 
fail to generate enough evidence of wrongdoing to warrant disciplinary 
action. This Article further proposes that in these narrow circumstances, 
an employer should avoid collecting data as to purely private activity, 
unconnected to work obligations or alleged workplace misconduct, and 
may only track an employee’s vehicle long enough to obtain the 
information it needs to corroborate a suspicion of wrongdoing. If GPS 
tracking continues beyond this point, the employer risks having any 
disciplinary action it takes against the employee overturned in court and 
may also risk civil liability for unduly invading the employee’s privacy. 
Employing a corroboration framework similar to that of Illinois v. Gates7 
and Alabama v. White,8 this Article thus presents a clear set of guidelines 
for investigating workplace misconduct by GPS, one that will allow 
employers to use this investigative technique in a reasonable manner 
while simultaneously respecting the rights of employees to be free from 
overly intrusive investigations into their private affairs.  
Next, this Article considers GPS tracking for noninvestigatory work-
related purposes.9 Drawing upon a recent New York case,10 this Article 
                                                                                                                     
 5. See O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 725–26. 
 6. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985). See generally United States v. 
Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 823–24 (9th Cir. 2004) (summarizing “special needs” cases, including 
those where the doctrine was deemed not to apply). 
 7. 462 U.S. 213 (1983). 
 8. 496 U.S. 325 (1990). 
 9. See O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 723 (adopting a framework for analyzing searches performed 
for “either a noninvestigatory work-related” purpose or to investigate “suspected work-related 
employee misfeasance”).  
 10. Carniol v. N.Y.C. Taxi & Limousine Comm’n, 975 N.Y.S.2d 842, 849 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
2013), aff’d, 2 N.Y.S.3d 337 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015).  
 
3
McAliister: GPS and Cell Phone Tracking of Employees
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2019
1268 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70 
 
proposes that wholesale GPS tracking of an entire segment of employees, 
such as a group of taxi-cab or Uber drivers, should be performed only for 
legitimate business purposes and only if employees consent to such 
monitoring in advance. This Article further proposes that to remain 
reasonable in scope, employers should avoid collecting GPS data while 
its employees are off duty.11 
Finally, this Article addresses location tracking by employers through 
smartphone apps, including apps designed for employee timekeeping 
purposes. Because employees who use such apps typically consent to the 
monitoring of their phone’s location and voluntarily convey evidence of 
their location to their employers, this Article concludes that this form of 
location tracking is simply not a Fourth Amendment “search,” either 
under the physical trespass test or under the Katz test, such that it is 
generally not an invasion of privacy. As a result, this Article predicts that 
employer use of such apps will grow exponentially in the coming years 
given the more relaxed privacy laws—flowing from the Fourth 
Amendment concepts of consent and assumption of risk—that govern 
this form of location tracking.12  
Part I of this Article summarizes the general privacy rights of both 
public and private employees. Part II examines the law governing GPS 
tracking by law enforcement and how it impacts the emerging law of GPS 
tracking by employers, an issue addressed in Part III. Finally, Part IV 
examines the tracking of an employee’s movements via GPS-enabled 
smartphone.  
I.  EMPLOYEE PRIVACY PROTECTIONS 
American workers, whether employed by public or private employers, 
are entitled to privacy protections in the workplace.13 Along with the 
protections afforded by various statutes, employees may be protected 
                                                                                                                     
 11. See infra notes 292–318 and accompanying text. 
 12. See generally Cunningham v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Labor, 997 N.E.2d 468, 477 (N.Y. 
2013) (Abdus-Salaam, J., concurring) (“Given the majority’s imprimatur of warrantless GPS 
tracking, less intrusive methods for investigating government employees will almost certainly be 
replaced with electronic surveillance.”); David K. Isom, Location Based Electronic Discovery in 
Criminal and Civil Litigation - Part 1, UTAH B.J. 28, 32 (2011) (“With hundreds of thousands of 
apps now available, and thousands of geo-apps, and more on the way, apps-engendered location 
metadata will continue to increase in volume and importance.”); Scott McCartney, A New Level 
of Security on Your Business Trip, WALL ST. J. (May 30, 2018, 9:11 A.M.), https://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/a-new-level-of-security-on-your-business-trip-1527685866 [https://perma.cc/C9RH-
D23L] (reporting that U.S. companies are tracking employees through their smartphones much 
more frequently than in the past). 
 13. See O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 715 (establishing that employees of public employers enjoy 
Fourth Amendment protections in the workplace). 
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from employer intrusions by constitutional provisions and tort law.14 
Because the rules governing public and private employers differ in some 
respects, one must first determine the type of employer at issue in a given 
case to properly analyze a workplace privacy claim. This section 
summarizes the usual privacy claims brought against both types of 
employers.  
A.  Employees of Public Employers 
When an employee of a public employer believes her privacy rights 
have been violated, she will generally sue her employer under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983, alleging a violation of her constitutional right to be free from 
“unreasonable searches and seizures” under the Fourth Amendment.15  
Although the Fourth Amendment is often applied to law enforcement 
in the context of criminal investigations, the Supreme Court has applied 
the Fourth Amendment to other types of government officials, including 
public school officials,16 building inspectors,17 and health and safety 
inspectors.18 However, because such actors are usually not engaged in 
criminal investigations, their actions are judged according to a general 
“reasonableness” standard; the criminal law standard, by contrast, 
involves a more specific reasonableness analysis of whether the police 
should have obtained a warrant or acted pursuant to some warrant 
exception.19 Searches and investigations by public employers are 
likewise subject to the general reasonableness approach, such that a 
public employer’s workspace intrusion is judged by the reasonableness 
of the employer’s actions under the circumstances of each case.20  
To fully comprehend the law with respect to employee tracking, it is 
necessary to understand the broader contours of Fourth Amendment 
analysis. Generally speaking, the Fourth Amendment prohibits 
“unreasonable searches and seizures” by government officials.21 At its 
                                                                                                                     
 14. See infra notes 101–08 (discussing various privacy-related torts and statutes). 
 15. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see, e.g., O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 714 (noting that the plaintiff 
in the case, Dr. Ortega, brought suit against his employer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “alleging that 
the search of his office violated the Fourth Amendment”); see also West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 
48 (1988) (“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured 
by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was 
committed by a person acting under color of state law.”).  
 16. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 334 (1985). 
 17. See Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528, 540 (1967). 
 18. See Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312–13, 324 (1978). 
 19. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341.  
 20. See O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 718. 
 21. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108–09 (1977) 
(“The touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always ‘the reasonableness in 
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most basic level, there are three steps to Fourth Amendment analysis. In 
the first step, courts consider the threshold question of whether a 
“search”22 or “seizure”23 has occurred, without which the Fourth 
Amendment does not apply.24 To determine whether a Fourth 
Amendment search has occurred, courts generally employ the 
“reasonable expectation of privacy” test derived from Katz v. United 
States.25 Under the Katz test, a search occurs only when the government 
violates a person’s expectation of privacy that society recognizes as 
legitimate or reasonable.26 Under this test, the reasonableness of any 
asserted expectation of privacy is context-specific,27 and will depend on 
various factors, such as the intrusiveness of an investigative technique,28 
                                                                                                                     
all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security.’” 
(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968))). 
 22. The term “search” is a legal term of art distinct from its ordinary dictionary definition. 
See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32 n.1 (2001) (contrasting the Fourth Amendment 
definition of “search” with the dictionary definition of “search”). Indeed, many routine forms of 
police surveillance are not considered Fourth Amendment “searches,” such as a dog sniff at an 
airport, even where the obvious purpose of the activity is to uncover evidence of a crime. See 
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983). 
 23. Fourth Amendment claims may involve seizures of persons and seizures of property. 
Under Fourth Amendment precedent, “[a] ‘seizure’ of property occurs when there is some 
meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests in that property.” United States 
v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). Seizures of persons include both investigative detentions 
of limited scope and duration, which must be supported by a reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity as well as arrests, which are more intrusive than investigative detentions and therefore 
require the existence of probable cause to be reasonable. United States v. Davis, 94 F.3d 1465, 
1467–68 (10th Cir. 1996). 
 24. See 19 WILLIAM A. KNOX, MISSOURI PRACTICE SERIES: CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 4:1 (3d ed. 2017) (“If no ‘search’ or ‘seizure’ takes place, then the Fourth 
Amendment inquiry may be terminated because when there is no search or seizure, there is no 
need to obtain a warrant or even to consider whether the search or seizure was ‘reasonable.’”).  
 25. 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 26. Id. at 360–61 (“[T]here is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an 
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is 
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.”’); see also Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 32–33 (discussing this 
framework); United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 2000) (speaking in terms of a 
“legitimate expectation of privacy,” or “one that society is prepared to accept as objectively 
reasonable”). 
 27. See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715 (1987) (“[T]he reasonableness of an 
expectation of privacy, as well as the appropriate standard for a search, is understood to differ 
according to context.”). Compare Leventhal v. Knapek, 266 F.3d 64, 73 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding, 
based on the particular facts of the case, that employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the contents of his office computer), with United States v. Barrows, 481 F.3d 1246, 1248–49 (10th 
Cir. 2007) (finding employee had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of a 
personal computer he “voluntarily transferred . . . to a public place for work-related use”). 
 28. A custodial arrest, for example, requires a greater degree of suspicion to be reasonable 
than does a suspect’s brief, noncustodial detention. Compare New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 
18 (1990) (noting the “long . . . settled” rule that “a warrantless arrest in a public place [is] 
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the suspect’s status,29 the location of the search,30 and the precise manner 
of investigation—including whether sophisticated technology was 
employed.31 In the employment context, expectations of privacy also 
largely depend on whether an employee has been notified of, and has 
consented to, the monitoring at issue.32 Courts also consider the 
                                                                                                                     
permissible as long as the arresting officer had probable cause”), with Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 
20–22 (1968) (authorizing a brief, temporary seizure of a person suspected of committing a crime 
on the basis of reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause). Likewise, a strip search requires 
a greater degree of suspicion than a search of a person’s backpack or outer clothing. See Safford 
Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 373–77 (2009) (permitting search of a teenage 
girl’s backpack and outer clothing but striking down a search of her underwear and bra which was 
a “quantum leap from outer clothes and backpacks”). 
 29. For example, K–12 students and arrestees enjoy less Fourth Amendment protection than 
ordinary adult citizens. As one specific example, adult citizens enjoy full Fourth Amendment 
protection in their closed containers, which require either a warrant or an applicable warrant 
exception to search. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1977), abrogated by 
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991). In the K–12 context, however, warrantless searches 
of lockers, purses, backpacks, cars, and clothing have all been upheld as reasonable based on a 
mere “reasonable suspicion” that the student violated either the law or school rules. See Bernard 
James, T.L.O. and Cell Phones: Student Privacy and Smart Devices After Riley v. California, 101 
IOWA L. REV. 343, 350–51 (2015). 
 30. For example, the Supreme Court has ruled that dog sniffs do not constitute Fourth 
Amendment “searches,” given that the asserted expectation of privacy is unreasonable when the 
dog sniff occurs in the airport (involving a passenger’s luggage), or on a public road (where a dog 
is employed to sniff around a car). Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 410 (2005); United States 
v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983). On the other hand, the Court ruled in 2013 that police 
deployment of a drug-sniffing dog on the front porch of a home was a “search” for Fourth 
Amendment purposes. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 11–12 (2013).  
 31. For example, a suspect’s location may typically be determined, without judicial 
approval, via cell tower records, but may not be obtained without a warrant through a GPS device 
that police attach to the same suspect’s vehicle. See Marc McAllister, GPS and Cell Phone 
Tracking: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis, 82 U. CIN. L. REV. 207, 221–29 (2013) 
(comparing cases); see also Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34–36 (striking down warrantless police use of a 
thermal imaging device to scan the outside of a suspect’s home, and recognizing that searches 
conducted via sophisticated technologies are fundamentally distinct from those that are not); 
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“I do not regard as 
dispositive the fact that the government might obtain the fruits of GPS monitoring through lawful 
conventional surveillance techniques.”). 
 32. See United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 2000) (“Government 
employees may have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their offices . . . . However, office 
practices, procedures, or regulations may reduce legitimate privacy expectations.”); id. (on the 
merits, finding that search of employee’s computer did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights 
because company’s Internet policy allowed it to “‘audit, inspect, and/or monitor’ employees’ use 
of the Internet, including all file transfers, all websites visited, and all e-mail messages,” such that 
the employee could not reasonably expect privacy in files downloaded from the Internet); see also 
United States v. Yudong Zhu, 23 F. Supp. 3d 234, 240–42 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (upholding computer 
search over Fourth Amendment challenge in part because employee gave written consent to 
inspection when he began his employment); United States v. Hamilton, 778 F. Supp. 2d 651, 654 
(E.D. Va. 2011) (finding public school employee could not reasonably expect privacy in e-mails 
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ownership of the property subject to intrusion, as employees generally 
enjoy fewer expectations of privacy in property owned by their 
employers, particularly where an employer policy authorizes searches 
and inspections of the property.33 
In deciding whether a Fourth Amendment search has occurred, courts 
alternatively apply the physical trespass-based test,34 which became more 
prominent in search analysis as a result of the United States Supreme 
Court’s 2012 decision in United States v. Jones.35 Under this test, courts 
consider whether the government “obtain[ed] information by physically 
intruding” on a person, house, paper, or effect,36 in which case a Fourth 
Amendment search occurred, regardless of whether it would be 
reasonable to expect privacy in the case.37 In Jones, the Court held that a 
Fourth Amendment search occurred when police obtained location 
information by trespassorily attaching a GPS tracking device to a criminal 
suspect’s vehicle, an “effect” under the Fourth Amendment, and using 
that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements.38 As a result, the Jones 
                                                                                                                     
with his wife that were stored on his work computer because he was on notice that contents of his 
computer were subject to inspection, which he acknowledged); Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic 
Ass’n, 865 P.2d 633, 655 (Cal. 1994) (“[T]he presence or absence of opportunities to consent 
voluntarily to activities impacting privacy interests obviously affects the expectations of the 
participant.”). 
 33. See, e.g., Simons, 206 F.3d at 398; Hamilton, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 654; cf. Riley v. 
California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2488–91 (2014) (examining the substantial privacy rights in modern 
cell phones, and declaring that “a cell phone search would typically expose to the government far 
more than the most exhaustive search of a house” because a phone contains not only “many 
sensitive records previously found in the home,” but also “a broad array of private information 
never found in a home in any form”). 
 34. See Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 677 F.3d 519, 543 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(“There are two ways in which the government’s conduct may constitute a ‘search’ implicating 
the Fourth Amendment.”). 
 35. 565 U.S. 400, 405–06 (2012); see also United States v. Cowan, 674 F.3d 947, 955 (8th 
Cir. 2012) (“An individual may challenge a search under the Fourth Amendment if it violates the 
individual’s ‘reasonable expectation of privacy,’ or involves an unreasonable ‘physical intrusion 
of a constitutionally protected area.”’ (citations omitted) (quoting Jones, 565 U.S. at 414)); United 
States v. Johnson, 871 F. Supp. 2d 539, 546 (W.D. La. 2012) (“Jones established, or perhaps 
reiterated, that there are two ways to analyze [whether a Fourth Amendment ‘search’ has 
occurred]: a traditional common-law property rights test and the Katz/reasonable-expectation-of-
privacy test.”).  
 36. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (establishing, in pertinent part, “[t]he right of the people to 
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures”). 
 37. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 5 (2013) (quoting Jones, 565 U.S. at 406–07 n.3). 
 38. Jones, 565 U.S. at 404 (“We hold that the Government’s installation of a GPS device 
on a target’s vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements, constitutes a 
‘search.’” (footnote omitted)). 
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majority did not consider whether a search would have occurred under 
the alternative reasonable expectation of privacy test.39 
Once a court determines that a Fourth Amendment search or seizure 
has occurred in a given case, the court must then determine whether the 
government’s conduct was “reasonable.”40 In the context of criminal 
investigations, a warrant or some warrant exception is generally required 
for a search or seizure to be reasonable.41 In addition searches or seizures 
ordinarily require a finding of probable cause, whether before the search, 
in the case of warrants, or afterwards, in the case of many of the numerous 
search warrant exceptions.42  
Outside the criminal context, courts determine whether a particular 
search was reasonable by balancing the government’s interests against 
the plaintiff’s interests to arrive at a framework for assessing 
reasonableness, then applying that framework to the case at hand.43 As 
                                                                                                                     
 39. See id. at 406. 
 40. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353–54 (1967) (turning to “[t]he question 
remaining for decision [of] whether the search and seizure conducted in this case complied with 
constitutional standards” after finding that a “search” had occurred in the case); cf. Smith v. 
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–46 (1979) (“The installation and use of a pen register . . . was not a 
‘search,’ and no warrant was required.”). 
 41. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 (“‘Over and again this Court has emphasized 
that’ . . . searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or 
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few 
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” (footnote omitted) (quoting United 
States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951))); United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 822 (9th Cir. 
2004) (recognizing that in the criminal context, either a warrant or an applicant warrant exception 
may satisfy the Fourth Amendment); Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment 
is Worse than the Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 5, 7 (1994) (arguing that the purpose of the Fourth 
Amendment is to control executive power and that it does so via a strong preference for searches 
and seizures conducted pursuant to warrants); cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968) (explaining 
why a specific type of police conduct, the Terry “stop and frisk,” is not subject to the ordinary 
requirements of a warrant and probable cause). 
 42. Many warrant exceptions require probable cause. Under the automobile exception to 
the warrant requirement, for example, police may search a vehicle without a warrant if they have 
probable cause to believe the vehicle contains evidence of a crime and the vehicle is “readily 
mobile.” See Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996). Also, under the search incident 
to arrest exception, police must have probable cause to arrest a suspect before they may search 
the arrestee as an incident to the arrest. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (“A 
custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth 
Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no additional 
justification. . . . [Thus,] in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not 
only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a ‘reasonable’ 
search under that Amendment.”). The plain view exception to the warrant requirement likewise 
requires a showing of probable cause. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326 (1987) (holding that 
probable cause is required to seize an item under the plain view exception). 
 43. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337–41 (1985) (explaining, in one special 
needs scenario, why the warrant and probable cause requirements are particularly unsuited to the 
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this law has developed, the Supreme Court has often held that such 
“special needs” searches must be both reasonable at their inception and 
reasonable in scope,44 but the Court has generally refused to require either 
warrants or probable cause, opting instead for a less rigorous level of 
suspicion.45 
Finally, once a court determines that a search or seizure has occurred 
(under step 1), and if such action was deemed unreasonable (under step 
2), the court must determine the remedy for the Fourth Amendment 
violation.46 In the criminal prosecution context, the usual remedy is 
exclusion of any evidence obtained as a result of the violation,47 without 
which a criminal prosecution will often fail.48 The exclusionary rule also 
applies in certain employee disciplinary proceedings.49 Nevertheless, in 
the employment context—such as in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil suit alleging 
a Fourth Amendment violation—the usual remedy is money damages for 
the employee whose Fourth Amendment rights were violated.50  
O’Connor v. Ortega,51 which involved an alleged Fourth Amendment 
violation by a public employer, illustrates the first and second steps 
                                                                                                                     
K–12 school environment and adopting a general reasonableness standard for assessing the 
legality of a student search). 
 44. See, e.g., id. at 341–42 (applying this framework to K–12 school searches).  
 45. See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 720–22 (1987) (rejecting the warrant and 
probable cause requirements in the employment context). In one special needs scenario, the Court 
found that “[t]he warrant requirement . . . is unsuited to the [K–12] school environment [because] 
requiring a teacher to obtain a warrant before searching a child suspected of an infraction of school 
rules (or of the criminal law) would unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift and 
informal disciplinary procedures needed in the schools.” T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340. For similar 
reasons, the T.L.O. Court found the probable cause requirement inapplicable as well. See id. at 
341.  
 46. See generally Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 590–91 (2006) (recognizing that 
although evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is often excluded in a 
subsequent criminal prosecution, exclusion is not always required). 
 47. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (establishing the general rule that “all 
evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is . . . inadmissible in 
a state court”). There are, however, numerous exceptions to the exclusionary rule in the criminal 
context. See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 464 S.W.3d 724, 734 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (refusing to 
exclude evidence obtained from an illegal instance of GPS tracking under the attenuation 
exception to the exclusionary rule). 
 48. Whether a criminal conviction may be obtained, despite the exclusion of a key piece of 
evidence, will of course depend on whether the prosecution has additional, legally-obtained 
evidence sufficient to support a conviction.  
 49. See Cunningham v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Labor, N.Y.S.2d 432, 435 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2011), rev’d, 997 N.E.2d 468 (N.Y. 2013) (involving application of the exclusionary rule in an 
employee disciplinary proceeding, rather than in an invasion of privacy suit against the employer). 
 50. See, e.g., K-Mart Corp. Store No. 7441 v. Trotti, 677 S.W.2d 632, 638 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1984) (noting that a plaintiff-employee was awarded $108,000 in damages for an invasion of 
privacy by her employer).  
 51. 480 U.S. 709 (1987). 
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outlined above, and is particularly significant in assessing the privacy 
rights of employees. 52  
O’Connor involved a search of the office of a state hospital employee, 
Dr. Magno Ortega. The search uncovered personal items later used in an 
administrative proceeding resulting in the employee’s termination.53 
Applying the reasonable expectation of privacy test, the Court first 
clarified that a search or seizure of a government employee’s property 
may be subject to Fourth Amendment restraints, thereby rejecting the 
employer’s argument that public employees may never reasonably expect 
privacy at work.54 Noting that Fourth Amendment protections are 
contextual,55 the Court then declared that different workplaces generate 
different expectations of privacy depending on their unique “operational 
realities.”56 According to the Court, factors that may influence actual 
expectations of privacy in a particular workplace include “actual office 
practices and procedures,”57 “the context of the employment relation,”58 
and “legitimate regulation” of the workspace.59 The Court noted, for 
example, that some government offices may be so open to others that no 
expectation of privacy is reasonable.60 In the employment context, other 
factors—including, most notably, notice and consent to the employer 
practice at issue61—have become critical as well. 
Turning to the particular circumstances of Dr. Ortega’s workplace, the 
Court determined that Dr. Ortega could indeed reasonably expect privacy 
in his office.62 The Court emphasized that Dr. Ortega did not share his 
desk or file cabinets with other employees, that he had occupied his office 
for 17 years and had kept personal materials there, and that his 
expectation of privacy was not diminished by any hospital policy 
discouraging employees from storing personal items in desks or file 
cabinets.63 As such, Dr. Ortega reasonably expected privacy “at least in 
his desk and file cabinets.”64 
Having determined that Dr. Ortega was indeed entitled to Fourth 
Amendment protection, the Court then sought to determine “the standard 
                                                                                                                     
 52. Id. at 715 (plurality opinion). 
 53. Id. at 712–13. 
 54. Id. at 715, 717. 
 55. Id. at 715. 
 56. Id. at 717. 
 57. Id.  
 58. Id.  
 59. Id.  
 60. Id.  
 61. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
 62. O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 718 (plurality opinion). 
 63. Id. at 718–19. 
 64. Id. at 719. 
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of reasonableness applicable to [this] particular class of [workplace] 
searches.”65 As a special needs scenario involving a non-criminal 
investigation, the applicable reasonableness standard would be 
determined by balancing the nature of the intrusion into the employee’s 
private affairs against the employer interests at stake, including “the 
government’s need for supervision, control, and the efficient operation of 
the workplace.”66  
After weighing the competing interests, the Court determined that the 
warrant requirement should not apply in this scenario, as public 
employers “are hardly in the business of investigating the violation of 
criminal laws” and instead conduct “work-related searches [as a mere] 
incident to the primary business of the [employer].”67 For similar reasons, 
the Court determined that probable cause should not be required.68 As a 
result, the Court concluded that “public employer intrusions on the 
constitutionally protected privacy interests of government employees for 
[1] noninvestigatory, work-related purposes, as well as for [2] 
investigations of work-related misconduct, should be judged by the 
standard of reasonableness under all the circumstances.”69  
Regarding the noninvestigatory form of intrusion, the Court noted that 
the reasonableness inquiry would not be particularly rigorous, and that 
public employers should be afforded “wide latitude” to perform such 
intrusions70 given that the employer’s interest in efficient operation of the 
workplace is “substantial” vis-à-vis the relatively limited expectations of 
privacy enjoyed by employees, which “are far less than those found at 
home or in some other contexts.”71 The Court “[came] to a similar 
conclusion for searches conducted pursuant to an investigation of work-
related employee misconduct,”72 and further emphasized that a 
“reasonable suspicion” standard, as opposed to probable cause, would 
best serve the needs of such employers “in [promptly] correcting the 
employee misconduct.”73 
Finally, the Court declared that a public employer search—regardless 
of whether it is conducted for an investigatory or noninvestigatory 
                                                                                                                     
 65. Id.  
 66. Id. at 719–20. 
 67. Id. at 722. 
 68. See id. at 722–25. The Court emphasized that its decision was limited to public 
employer searches that involve either a noninvestigatory work-related intrusion or an 
investigatory search for evidence of suspected work-related employee malfeasance. See id. at 
725–26. 
 69. Id. at 725–26.  
 70. Id. at 723. 
 71. Id. at 725. 
 72. Id. at 724. 
 73. Id.  
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purpose—will be deemed “reasonable” only if reasonable at its inception 
and in its scope.74 As to the first prong, the Court declared that a search 
of an employee’s office will be “‘justified at its inception’ when there are 
reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence 
that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct, or that the search 
is necessary for a noninvestigatory work-related purpose such as to 
retrieve a needed file” from an employee’s office.75 Finally, the Court 
added that such a search will be reasonable in scope when “the measures 
adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not 
excessively intrusive in light of . . . the nature of the [misconduct].”76  
O’Connor provides four significant takeaways for the question of 
whether employee tracking is lawful. First, O’Connor established that 
government employees may enjoy Fourth Amendment protections in a 
given workplace, depending on its unique circumstances.77 Second, 
O’Connor ruled that the Fourth Amendment claim of a public employee 
will depend on whether the employer acted reasonably, both at inception 
and in scope.78 Third, for a search to be reasonable at its inception, the 
employer conducting the search must have had “reasonable suspicion”79 
either that the search would turn up evidence of work-related misconduct, 
or that the search was necessary for a noninvestigatory work-related 
purpose, such as to retrieve a needed file from an employee’s office.80 
Finally, to be reasonable in scope, the employer’s search must not be 
“excessively intrusive in light of . . . the nature of the [misconduct].”81 
                                                                                                                     
 74. Id. at 725–26.  
 75. Id. at 726.  
 76. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985)). 
 77. Id. at 725–26. 
 78. Id. at 726.  
 79. See id. at 724 (“The delay in correcting the employee misconduct caused by the need 
for probable cause rather than reasonable suspicion will be translated into tangible and often 
irreparable damage to the agency’s work, and ultimately to the public interest.” (emphasis 
added)). Although at times the O’Connor Court used the phrase, “reasonable grounds for 
suspecting,” this phrase has been repeatedly used by the Supreme Court in Fourth Amendment 
cases as a substitute for the familiar “reasonable suspicion” standard. See United States v. Vinton, 
594 F.3d 14, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (recognizing that, in the context of the search incident to arrest 
exception to the warrant requirement, the Court’s use of the phrase “reasonable to believe” in 
Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009), “probably is akin to the ‘reasonable suspicion’ standard”). 
Moreover, courts have interpreted the O’Connor language itself as requiring a showing of 
“reasonable suspicion.” See Cunningham v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Labor, 997 N.E.2d 468, 473 (N.Y. 
2013) (“Under O’Connor, a workplace search based on a reasonable suspicion of employee 
misconduct is ‘justified at its inception.’” (quoting O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 726 (plurality 
opinion))).  
 80. O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 726 (plurality opinion).  
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Over twenty years after O’Connor, the Supreme Court applied the 
O’Connor framework in another public employer search case, City of 
Ontario v. Quon,82 involving the city’s review of text messages sent and 
received on Ontario police officer Jeff Quon’s employer-issued pager.83 
Before acquiring the pagers, the city informed its officers that it had a 
right to review text messages sent and received using the pagers.84 After 
Officer Quon and others had reimbursed the city multiple times for 
exceeding their monthly allowance of text messages, the city wished to 
determine whether the monthly text message character limit should be 
increased, requiring the city to determine whether officers like Quon were 
incurring overage fees for work-related or personal messages.85 To that 
end, Quon’s supervisors obtained two months of pager transcripts from 
provider Arch Wireless.86 After redacting all messages Quon sent while 
off duty, officials learned that most of Quon’s text messages sent during 
work hours were not work-related.87 As a result, Quon was disciplined 
for pursuing personal matters while on duty.88 Quon then sued the city, 
alleging that it violated his Fourth Amendment rights by reviewing his 
pager messages.89 After the lower courts issued differing rulings on the 
issue, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the 
Fourth Amendment claim.90  
During the Supreme Court proceedings, the parties agreed that the 
O’Connor framework would control.91 Applying that framework, the 
Court assumed that Quon reasonably expected privacy in the contents of 
his text messages92 and went on to address the overall reasonableness of 
the search by considering whether it was justified at its inception and 
reasonable in scope.93  
Finding the search reasonable under both prongs, the Court first 
declared that the text message review was “justified at its inception 
because there were ‘reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search 
[was] necessary for a noninvestigatory work-related purpose,’”94 namely, 
                                                                                                                     
 82. 560 U.S. 746 (2010). 
 83. Id. at 752. 
 84. Id. at 751–52. 
 85. Id. at 752. 
 86. Id.  
 87. Id. at 752–53. 
 88. Id. at 753. The Court says that “Quon was allegedly disciplined.” Id.  
 89. Id. at 754. There were other plaintiffs and defendants in the case. See id. at 753. For 
simplicity, this Article limits its discussion to Quon’s suit against the City. 
 90. See id. at 754–55 (describing the lower court rulings). 
 91. Id. at 757. 
 92. Id. at 760. 
 93. Id. at 760–61. 
 94. Id. at 761. 
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to ensure the city was paying only for work-related, rather than personal, 
communications.95  
As for the search’s scope, the Court emphasized the limited scope of 
the city’s review, noting that although Quon had exceeded his monthly 
character limit several times, the city reviewed only two months of 
transcripts and redacted all messages Quon sent while off duty, which 
reduced the review’s intrusiveness.96 Finally, the Court noted that Quon 
had been informed his text messages could be reviewed and thus had 
“received no assurances of privacy,” thereby “lessen[ing] the risk that the 
[city’s] review would intrude on highly private details of Quon’s life.”97 
For these reasons, the Court found no Fourth Amendment violation.98 
B.  Employees of Private Employers 
Given the lack of state action, private employers are typically not 
subject to Fourth Amendment constraints.99 Nevertheless, private 
employers may face liability for alleged privacy invasions through tort 
law, including the torts of intrusion upon seclusion (intrusion),100 public 
                                                                                                                     
 95. Id. (quoting O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 726 (1987) (plurality opinion)). 
 96. Id. at 761–62. 
 97. Id. at 762–63. 
 98. Id. at 763–65. 
 99. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 613–14 (1989) (“The 
Amendment guarantees the privacy, dignity, and security of persons against certain arbitrary and 
invasive acts by officers of the Government or those acting at their direction.”). Purely private 
action cannot form the basis for a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil suit based on an alleged Fourth 
Amendment violation. See, e.g., English v. Univ. of Tulsa, No. 14-CV-0284-CVE-FHM, 2015 
WL 4623942, at *4–5 (N.D. Okla. Aug. 3, 2015) (dismissing plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim 
when campus security officers of the University of Tulsa, a private university, entered plaintiff’s 
apartment without consent because the alleged Fourth Amendment violation by campus police 
was not committed by a person “acting under color of state law” (quoting West v. Atkins, 487 
U.S. 42, 48 (1988))). However, in limited instances, a private employer could be subject to 
constitutional constraints, particularly where the private party acts as an instrument or agent of 
the Government. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 614. Whether a private individual or entity should be 
deemed an agent of the government for Fourth Amendment purposes is determined by the totality 
of the circumstances. Id. Under this test, most courts consider two primary factors: (1) whether 
the government directed, or acquiesced in, the intrusive conduct; and (2) whether the party 
performing the search intended to assist law enforcement efforts or to further his own ends. Under 
this test, the greater the government involvement in the search, the less important the private 
searcher’s intent. See, e.g., Piazzola v. Watkins, 442 F.2d 284, 289 (5th Cir. 1971) (striking down 
a college dorm room search conducted by both local law enforcement officers and university 
officials, at the request and direction of the local police, and recognizing that a university 
regulation permitting administrative inspections of dorm rooms “cannot be construed or applied 
so as to give consent to a search for evidence for the primary purpose of a criminal prosecution”).  
 100. See Koeppel v. Speirs, 808 N.W.2d 177, 180–81 (Iowa 2011) (describing the four 
invasion of privacy torts). 
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disclosure of truthful but private facts about an individual,101 placing a 
person in a “false light” by unreasonable and highly objectionable 
publicity,102 and appropriating the name or likeness of another for one’s 
own commercial use or benefit.103 These distinct forms of invasion each 
involve an interference with a person’s “right to be left alone.”104 For 
workplace intrusions, private employers might also be governed by 
privacy statutes, including the federal Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act105 and the Stored Communications Act,106 either of which 
might restrain employers from intercepting or reviewing employee e-
mail, telephone calls, and other electronic communications.107 In 
addition, some state statutes specifically make it unlawful for employers 
to utilize GPS tracking as a means of investigating their employees, often 
with an exception based on employee consent.108 
                                                                                                                     
 101. This tort involves publication of information that would be highly offensive to a 
reasonable person and not of legitimate public interest. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D 
(AM. LAW INST. 1977). In one case, for example, a plaintiff employee sued her former employer 
under this tort when the former employer posted an interoffice memo about the plaintiff’s 
termination on a bulletin board visible to numerous employees. Payton v. City of Santa Clara, 183 
Cal. Rptr. 17, 17 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982). 
 102. “To prevail on a claim of ‘false light,’ a plaintiff ‘must show that a highly offensive 
false statement was publicized by [defendants] with knowledge or in reckless disregard of the 
falsity.’” Taha v. Bucks Cty., 9 F. Supp. 3d 490, 493 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (quoting Santillo v. Reedel, 
634 A.2d 264, 266 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993)), aff’d, 862 F.3d 292 (3d Cir. 2017); see, e.g., id. at 491, 
494 (finding sufficient “false light” claim against company based on plaintiff’s allegations that 
company selectively published his expunged arrest record and mugshot on its website in order to 
falsely portray him as a criminal, thereby creating a false impression regarding his criminal history 
and character). 
 103. Under this cause of action, liability arises from the use of the name or likeness of a 
public figure absent consent. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. b. 
 104. Koeppel, 808 N.W.2d at 181 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. b). 
 105. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 212 (1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–
2511 (2012)). 
 106. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1860 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–
2712 (2012)). 
 107. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (prohibiting the intentional interception of any electronic 
communication); Pure Power Boot Camp v. Warrior Fitness Boot Camp, 587 F. Supp. 2d 548, 
557–58 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (interpreting the ECPA, consistently with most courts’ interpretation, to 
apply only to the simultaneous “interception” of e-mail as it is being sent and received; for e-mails 
that are in storage, the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2012) would 
apply). 
 108. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-48d(b)(1) (2018) (requiring an employer to provide 
prior written notice to all employees informing them that they may be monitored electronically, 
as a general rule); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/21-2.5(b) (2018) (generally prohibiting persons in 
Illinois from using an electronic tracking device to determine the location or movement of a 
person, with an exception for consent, among others); Gerardi v. City of Bridgeport, 985 A.2d 
328, 333–34 (Conn. 2010) (suggesting the Connecticut statute would apply to GPS tracking). 
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The tort of intrusion is the most common tort used to sue employers 
for privacy invasions in the workplace, and its requirements overlap with 
those of the Fourth Amendment. To prevail on an intrusion claim, a 
plaintiff must prove that “(1) her solitude, seclusion, or private affairs 
were intentionally infringed upon, and that (2) this infringement would 
highly offend a reasonable person.”109 
Courts considering intrusion claims usually also consider whether the 
plaintiff could reasonably expect privacy in the case at hand, because 
without such an expectation an intrusion claim would fail.110 A recent 
District Court opinion denying a defendant’s motion to dismiss involving 
Facebook posts, Ehling v. Monmouth-Ocean Hospital Service Corp.,111 
exemplifies this reasonable expectation of privacy approach.  
According to the plaintiff’s allegations in Ehling, plaintiff Deborah 
Ehling was a registered nurse and paramedic who worked for Monmouth-
Ocean Hospital Service Corporation (MONOC), a nonprofit hospital 
service corporation in New Jersey.112 In July 2008, Ehling became the 
acting president of a local union for professional emergency medical 
services personnel, and in that capacity she sought to protect the rights of 
union members by filing various complaints against MONOC.113 
According to Ehling, her union activities caused MONOC to retaliate 
against her, eventually leading to her termination in July 2011.114  
                                                                                                                     
 109. Ehling v. Monmouth-Ocean Hosp. Serv. Corp., 872 F. Supp. 2d 369, 373 (D.N.J. 2012) 
(citing Bisbee v. John C. Conover Agency Inc., 452 A.2d 689 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982)) 
(applying New Jersey law); see also K-Mart Corp. Store No. 7441 v. Trotti, 677 S.W.2d 632, 636 
(Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (citing Indus. Found. of the S. v. Tex. Indus. Accident Bd., 540 S.W.2d 668, 
682 (Tex. 1975)) (“[I]n Texas, an actionable invasion of privacy by intrusion must consist of an 
unjustified intrusion of the plaintiff’s solitude or seclusion of such magnitude as to cause an 
ordinary individual to feel severely offended, humiliated, or outraged.”). 
 110. There appear to be two bases for considering whether a reasonable expectation of 
privacy exists, even though it is not usually thought of as a formal element of the tort of intrusion. 
According to some courts, the first element of the tort “requires an intentional intrusion into a 
matter the plaintiff has a right to expect privacy,” making it necessary to consider the threshold 
question of reasonable expectation of privacy. See, e.g., Koeppel v. Speirs, 808 N.W.2d 177, 181 
(Iowa 2011). According to other courts, an infringement upon one’s privacy cannot be highly 
offensive if there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in the first place. See, e.g., Acosta v. 
Scott Labor LLC, 377 F. Supp. 2d 647, 649–52 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (analyzing a plaintiff–employee’s 
intrusion upon seclusion claim by considering whether the employee could reasonably expect 
privacy in videotaping occurring at work and, upon finding he could not, stating that it need not 
address whether the alleged privacy intrusion was “highly offensive” to prove the tort of 
intrusion). 
 111. 872 F. Supp. 2d 369 (D.N.J. 2012). 
 112. Id. at 370. 
 113. Id.  
 114. Id.  
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From 2008 to 2009, Ehling maintained a private Facebook account 
with limited access to Ehling’s “friends.”115 Ehling invited many 
coworkers, but no members of MONOC management, to be her Facebook 
friends.116 In June 2009, MONOC officials gained access to Ehling’s 
Facebook account when a supervisor summoned a MONOC employee, 
who was one of Ehling’s Facebook friends, into an office and coerced 
him into accessing his Facebook account on a work computer in the 
supervisor’s presence.117 The supervisor then viewed and copied Ehling’s 
Facebook postings, including one unusual comment Ehling had made 
regarding a shooting at the Holocaust Museum in Washington, D.C., 
wherein Ehling blamed the D.C. paramedics for the death of a museum 
guard.118 
A few days later, MONOC officials informed the New Jersey Board 
of Nursing and the New Jersey Department of Health of Ehling’s 
Facebook post, expressing its concern that Ehling’s post “showed a 
disregard for patient safety.”119 According to Ehling, MONOC’s letters 
placed her nursing license at risk and were intended to damage her 
reputation and employment opportunities.120 As a result, Ehling sued 
MONOC and others for the tort of intrusion upon seclusion (common law 
invasion of privacy) due to the supervisor’s unauthorized “accessing of 
her private Facebook postings.”121 Defendants then moved to dismiss the 
claim, arguing that Ehling could not reasonably expect privacy in her 
Facebook post because it was disclosed to potentially hundreds of 
people.122 In response, Ehling argued that she could reasonably expect 
privacy in her post, at least insofar as the supervisor who accessed her 
page was concerned, because her comment was disclosed to a limited 
number of people whom she had personally invited to view a restricted 
access webpage.123  
Denying Defendants’ motion, the court noted that Ehling’s case 
occupied a middle ground between cases finding no reasonable 
expectation of privacy for “material posted to an unprotected website that 
anyone can view,” and those finding “a reasonable expectation of privacy 
for individual, password-protected online communications.”124 Because 
                                                                                                                     
 115. Id.  
 116. Id.  
 117. Id.  
 118. Id.  
 119. Id. at 370–71. 
 120. Id. at 371. 
 121. Id. at 372. 
 122. Id. at 372, 374. 
 123. Id. at 374. 
 124. Id. at 373–74 (emphasis omitted) (citing United States v. Gines-Perez, 214 F. Supp. 2d 
205, 225 (D.P.R. 2002), rev’d on other grounds, 90 F. App’x 3 (1st Cir. 2004); Stengart v. Loving 
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the matter was unclear, the court decided that Ehling’s intrusion claim 
should not be dismissed, explaining that “reasonableness (and 
offensiveness) are highly fact-sensitive inquiries” that are “not properly 
resolved on a motion to dismiss.”125 
Although Ehling’s case involved a suit against a private employer for 
the tort of intrusion, the court’s entire analysis of Ehling’s tortious 
intrusion claim at the motion to dismiss stage focused on whether Ehling 
could reasonably expect privacy in her Facebook post.126 Numerous other 
cases involving private employers follow the same approach and 
emphasize that the reasonable expectation of privacy analysis under the 
tort of intrusion involves both a subjective and objective component, just 
as it does under the Fourth Amendment.127  
Although the formal proof requirements of a Fourth Amendment 
claim (typically brought against a public employer) and an invasion of 
privacy tort claim (typically brought against a private employer) are 
distinct, a plaintiff suing either type of employer under either type of 
claim must ordinarily prove she could reasonably expect privacy in the 
case at hand.128 Nevertheless, because the tort of intrusion requires proof 
that the defendant’s invasion of a plaintiff’s privacy would cause an 
individual “to feel severely offended, humiliated, or outraged,”129 this tort 
is arguably more difficult to prove than a Fourth Amendment claim, 
which merely requires a plaintiff to prove the defendant’s conduct was 
“unreasonable.”130 Thus, it makes sense to first examine instances of 
employee tracking through an expectation of privacy lens, and then to 
consider whether reasonableness (under the Fourth Amendment) or 
extreme offensiveness (under the tort of intrusion) might change the 
outcome in a given case. Before addressing the most common methods 
of employee tracking, this Article examines the law that governs GPS 
                                                                                                                     
Care Agency, Inc., 990 A.2d 650 (N.J. 2010)). 
 125. Id. at 374. 
 126. See id. 
 127. See Stengart, 990 A.2d at 660–61 (comparing the two claims); see also, e.g., Acosta v. 
Scott Labor LLC, 377 F. Supp. 2d 647, 649–52 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (analyzing plaintiff-employee’s 
intrusion upon seclusion claim by examining whether his asserted expectation of privacy at work 
was reasonable); Stengart, 990 A.2d at 663–64 (analyzing plaintiff’s intrusion upon seclusion 
claim against a private employer by considering whether plaintiff could reasonably expect privacy 
in e-mails she retrieved on her work computer, examining both plaintiff’s subjective expectation 
of privacy and whether her expectation was objectively reasonable). 
 128. Cf. Stengart, 990 A.2d at 660 (“[T]he reasonable-expectation-of-privacy standard used 
by the parties [in a suit against a private employer] derives from the common law and the Search 
and Seizure Clauses of both the Fourth Amendment and . . . the New Jersey Constitution. The 
[constitutional] sources do not apply in this case, which involves conduct by private parties 
only.”). 
 129. K-Mart Corp. Store No. 7441 v. Trotti, 677 S.W.2d 632, 636 (Tex. App. 1984). 
 130. See Stengart, 990 A.2d at 660. 
 
19
McAliister: GPS and Cell Phone Tracking of Employees
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2019
1284 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70 
 
tracking by law enforcement, which necessarily impacts the related issue 
of GPS tracking by employers.  
II.  GPS TRACKING BY LAW ENFORCEMENT 
Although there are few reported cases involving GPS tracking by 
employers, those cases must be viewed in light of the United States 
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Jones,131 which involved 
GPS tracking by law enforcement.132  
A.  The Law of Electronic Tracking Before United States v. Jones 
Before Jones was decided in 2012, law enforcement routinely utilized 
GPS tracking devices, without having obtained a warrant authorizing 
them to do so, to monitor the movements of criminal suspects.133 When 
criminal defendants challenged this form of investigation, most courts 
rejected those challenges by invoking the principle that no person can 
reasonably expect privacy in his or her movements in public.134 This 
                                                                                                                     
 131. 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
 132. Id. at 403. 
 133. See, e.g., United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 272–73 (7th Cir. 2011), vacated, 
565 U.S. 1189 (2012) (describing an investigation in which Arizona police attached a GPS 
tracking device to the suspect’s Jeep and then tracked the Jeep’s movements into several states); 
United States v. Smith, 387 F. App’x. 918, 919 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (describing an 
investigation in Florida in which police installed a GPS device on the truck of a person suspected 
of trafficking marijuana); United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 607 (8th Cir. 2010) (recounting 
how DEA and Iowa state police placed a GPS tracking device on a vehicle’s bumper while it was 
parked in Iowa and used the device to monitor the vehicle’s movements to Colorado); United 
States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1213 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Over a four-month period, [DEA] 
agents [in Oregon] repeatedly monitored Pineda-Moreno’s Jeep using various types of mobile 
tracking devices.”), vacated, 565 U.S. 1189 (2010); United States v. Santiago, 560 F.3d 62, 64–
65 (1st Cir. 2009) (detailing “a year-long investigation into a large-scale heroin distribution 
operation” in 2003 and 2004 in Massachusetts, in which agents tracked defendant’s van with a 
GPS unit); United States v. Mayberry, 540 F.3d 506, 511 (6th Cir. 2008) (noting that in a robbery 
investigation, police in Michigan “secretly placed a GPS tracking device on the [defendant’s] 
rental car” while it was parked at an apartment complex); United States v. Wilson, 484 F.3d 267, 
281 (4th Cir. 2007) (detailing an extensive federal drug investigation in Maryland involving GPS 
trackers). 
 134. See, e.g., Marquez, 605 F.3d at 610 (“[W]hen police have reasonable suspicion that a 
particular vehicle is transporting drugs, a warrant is not required when, while the vehicle is parked 
in a public place, they install a noninvasive GPS tracking device on it for a reasonable period of 
time.”); Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1216–17 (invoking Knotts and holding that the GPS tracking 
of an individual’s movements in his vehicle over a prolonged period is not a search); United States 
v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 996–97 (7th Cir. 2007) (relying on Knotts and holding that GPS tracking 
is not a search); see also Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d at 276 (Flaum, J., concurring) (“The practice of 
using [GPS tracking] devices to monitor movements on public roads falls squarely within the 
[Supreme] Court’s consistent teaching that people do not have a legitimate expectation of privacy 
in that which they reveal to third parties or leave open to view by others.”).  
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result is seemingly supported by two Supreme Court cases from the 
1980s, each involving the tracking of a vehicle by electronic beeper. 
In United States v. Knotts,135 the Supreme Court upheld the warrantless 
use of a beeper to track a drum of chloroform along a 100-mile journey.136 
According to the Court in Knotts, the use of the beeper did not constitute 
a Fourth Amendment search because the beeper did not provide any 
information police could not have obtained through simple visual 
surveillance.137 Just one year later, the Court in United States v. Karo138 
reached the opposite result in a similar case, primarily because the beeper 
in that case was used to track a can of ether inside a private residence.139 
Distinguishing Knotts, the Court reasoned that “[i]ndiscriminate 
monitoring of property that has been withdrawn from public view” must 
remain subject to Fourth Amendment oversight.140  
Invoking Knotts, pre-Jones GPS tracking cases typically found that 
when a GPS tracking device is used to monitor a suspect’s movements 
on public roads, no Fourth Amendment search occurs—because a suspect 
cannot reasonably expect privacy in those movements given that police 
could have simply trailed the suspicious vehicle to obtain the same 
information.141 However, some pre-Jones courts refused to apply this 
rationale on the grounds that it fails to account for differences between 
trailing a vehicle for a few hours and using GPS technology to track that 
same vehicle for a substantially longer period of time, which is far more 
                                                                                                                     
 135. 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
 136. Id. at 276. Having suspected Knotts of manufacturing drugs, federal officers, without a 
warrant, had installed a beeper in a chemical drum they knew would be sold to Knotts. Id. at 278. 
With the beeper’s assistance, officers followed Knotts’s vehicle to where it stopped outside a 
certain cabin. Id. Based on this information, the police secured a warrant to search the cabin and 
uncovered incriminating evidence inside. Id. at 279. 
 137. According to the Knotts Court, “[a] person traveling in an automobile on public 
thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to 
another,” and the “use of the beeper to signal the presence of [the vehicle] . . . does not alter the 
situation.” Id. at 281–82. 
 138. 468 U.S. 705 (1984). 
 139. See id. at 714. 
 140. Id. at 716. As the Court explained, “[Karo] is thus not like Knotts, for there the beeper 
told the authorities nothing about the interior of Knotts’ cabin. . . . [H]ere, [by contrast] . . . the 
monitoring indicated that the beeper was inside the house, a fact that could not have been visually 
verified [by the police from outside the house].” Id. at 715.  
 141. See, e.g., United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1216 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(invoking Knotts and holding that the GPS tracking of an individual’s movements in his vehicle 
over a prolonged period is not a search), vacated, 565 U.S. 1189 (2012); United States v. Garcia, 
474 F.3d 994, 997 (7th Cir. 2007) (same), abrogated by 776 F.3d 513 (2015).  
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invasive.142 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Jones to resolve the 
split.143 
B.  United States v. Jones 
In Jones, all nine Justices of the United States Supreme Court struck down 
one instance of GPS tracking in which a suspect’s vehicle was monitored on 
public streets for nearly a month.144  
In Jones, officers surreptitiously installed a GPS tracking device on 
suspect Antoine Jones’s Jeep, without a valid warrant,145 and used the 
device to track the vehicle for twenty-eight days.146 The resulting GPS 
data connected Jones to a structure that contained cash and cocaine, 
leading to criminal charges against him.147 Before trial, Jones moved to 
suppress the evidence obtained through the GPS tracking device, but the 
trial court denied the motion by invoking the Knotts rationale that no 
person may reasonably expect privacy in his movements in public.148  
                                                                                                                     
 142. See, e.g., United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 555–68 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (rejecting 
the Government’s argument, based on an attempted extension of Knotts, that “[a] person traveling 
in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
movements from one place to another” even in such extended instances of GPS tracking); People 
v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1198–1201 (N.Y. 2009) (distinguishing Knotts) (“At first blush, it 
would appear that Knotts does not bode well for Mr. Weaver, for in his case, as in Knotts, the 
surveillance technology was utilized for the purpose of tracking the progress of a vehicle 
over . . . predominantly public roads and, as in Knotts, these movements were at least in theory 
exposed to ‘anyone who wanted to look.’ This, however, is where the similarity ends.” (quoting 
Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281)). 
 143. United States v. Jones, 564 U.S. 1036 (2011).  
 144. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012) (holding that “the Government’s 
installation of a GPS device on a target’s vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s 
movements, constitutes a [Fourth Amendment] ‘search,’” thereby presumptively requiring a 
warrant (footnote omitted)); see also id. at 430–31 (Alito, J., concurring) (concluding on behalf 
of Justices Alito, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan that the lengthy GPS monitoring that occurred in 
that case constituted a Fourth Amendment “search,” thereby presumptively requiring a warrant); 
id. at 413 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted) (agreeing with the majority that 
“a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment occurs, at a minimum, ‘[w]here, as here, 
the Government obtains information by physically intruding on a constitutionally protected area’” 
(alteration in original)). 
 145. Although the officers had obtained a warrant authorizing installation of the device, the 
device was installed after the warrant had expired and outside the jurisdiction specified in the 
warrant. See id. at 402–03 (majority opinion). 
 146. Id. at 403. The device relayed more than 2,000 pages of data regarding the vehicle’s 
movements over the four-week period. Id.  
 147. Id. at 403–04. 
 148. United States v. Jones, 451 F. Supp. 2d 71, 87–88 (D.D.C. 2006) (citing Knotts, 460 
U.S. at 281–82), rev’d in part, United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 2010). The 
District Court granted the motion in part, suppressing only the data obtained while the vehicle 
was parked in the garage adjoining Jones’s residence. Id. at 88. 
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On appeal, a majority of the Supreme Court—consisting of Justices 
Scalia, Roberts, Kennedy, Thomas, and Sotomayor149—considered 
“whether the attachment of a Global-Positioning-System (GPS) tracking 
device to an individual’s vehicle, and subsequent use of that device to 
monitor the vehicle’s movements on public streets, constitutes a search 
or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”150 By phrasing 
the issue in this manner, the Jones majority effectively limited its analysis 
to the movements of Jones’s vehicle “on public streets,”151 rather than 
within private spaces,152 potentially triggering the Knotts rationale that 
no person may reasonably expect privacy in his movements in public. 
Refusing to apply this rationale, the majority held that a search had 
occurred.153 Since no warrant justified the search, the evidentiary fruits 
of that search had to be suppressed.154  
While all nine Justices in Jones agreed that this particular instance of GPS 
tracking triggered the protections of the Fourth Amendment,155 the Justices 
                                                                                                                     
 149. Jones, 565 U.S. at 401. 
 150. Id. at 402. 
 151. Id. 
 152. In limiting the issue to the movements of Jones’s vehicle “on public streets,” the Jones 
majority seemingly accepted the District Court’s suppression of the GPS tracking data obtained 
while the vehicle was parked in the garage adjoining Jones’s residence. See id. at 402–03. 
 153. According to the majority, “the Government’s installation of a GPS device on a target’s 
vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements, constitutes a ‘search.’” Id. 
at 404. In its brief in Jones, the Government argued that individuals have no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in information that is knowingly exposed to public view, and that Antoine 
Jones himself had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the movements of his vehicle on public 
streets because that information was exposed to public view. See Brief for the United States at 18, 
38, Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (No. 10-1259). The Government argued that “[t]his case, like Knotts, 
involves movements of a vehicle on public streets,” which is unprotected by the Fourth 
Amendment. Id. at 19, 22. By ruling for Jones, the majority effectively rejected the Government’s 
Knotts-based argument. See also United States v. Garcia-Gonzalez, No. 14-10296-LTS, 2015 WL 
5145537, at *7 (D. Mass. Sept. 1, 2015) (“The [Jones] majority opinion also impliedly rejects as 
unsupported, by Knotts or otherwise, the suggestion that an unconstitutional search is permissible 
if it produces only public information.”). 
 154. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 413 (affirming the lower court’s judgment that admission of the 
evidence obtained by use of the GPS device violated the Fourth Amendment and refusing to 
address the Government’s argument that the warrantless “search” that occurred in this case was 
made reasonable, despite no valid warrant, by the reasonable suspicion or probable cause the 
officers had obtained before using the device). 
 155. See id. at 404 (holding that “the Government’s installation of a GPS device on a target’s 
vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements, constitutes a [Fourth 
Amendment] ‘search,’” thereby presumptively requiring a warrant (footnote omitted)); see also 
id. at 430–31 (Alito, J., concurring) (concluding on behalf of Justices Alito, Ginsburg, Breyer, 
and Kagan that the lengthy GPS monitoring that occurred in that case constituted a Fourth 
Amendment “search,” thereby presumptively requiring a warrant); id. at 413 (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring) (agreeing with the majority that “a search within the meaning of the Fourth 
 
23
McAliister: GPS and Cell Phone Tracking of Employees
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2019
1288 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70 
 
were split in their rationale on the question of whether a Fourth Amendment 
search had occurred. Five members of the Court applied the physical trespass 
doctrine and the remaining members of the Court—along with Justice 
Sotomayor, who endorsed both views—applied the Katz reasonable 
expectation of privacy test.156 Applying the physical trespass test, the 
majority declared that “a vehicle is an ‘effect’ as that term is used in the 
[Fourth] Amendment”157 and that in this case, the Government physically 
trespassed upon Jones’s vehicle by attaching the device to the vehicle 
without consent.158 According to the majority, “the Government’s 
installation of a GPS device on a target’s vehicle, and its use of that device 
to monitor the vehicle’s movements, constitutes a ‘search,’”159 which is 
presumptively unreasonable in the absence of a valid warrant.160 
Justice Alito’s concurring opinion, joined by Justices Ginsburg, 
Breyer, and Kagan, employed the Katz test instead, framing the issue as 
“whether the use of GPS tracking in [this] particular case involved a 
degree of intrusion that a reasonable person would not have 
anticipated.”161 Emphasizing the length of surveillance as a critical factor 
under Katz, the concurring Justices declared that the majority’s trespass-
based analysis “largely disregards what is really important (the use of a 
GPS for the purpose of long-term tracking),” emphasizing instead the 
officers’ seemingly insignificant act of trespassing upon Jones’s 
vehicle.162 In the view of these four Justices,  
                                                                                                                     
Amendment occurs, at a minimum, ‘[w]here, as here, the Government obtains information by 
physically intruding on a constitutionally protected area’” (alteration in original)). 
 156. See id. at 405–06, 414, 419. According to the majority, Katz did not repudiate the 
understanding that the Fourth Amendment embodies a particular concern for government trespass 
upon the areas it enumerates. See id. at 406–07 (majority opinion). Rather, “the Katz reasonable-
expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory 
test.” Id. at 409. Thus, as the majority saw it, “Jones’s Fourth Amendment rights do not rise or 
fall with the Katz formulation.” Id. at 406. For future cases, however, the majority clarified that 
“[s]ituations involving merely the transmission of electronic signals without trespass would 
remain subject to Katz analysis.” Id. at 411. 
 157. Id. at 404. 
 158. According to the majority, “[b]y attaching the device to the Jeep, officers encroached 
on a protected area.” Id. at 410. 
 159. Id. at 404 (footnote omitted). In a similar passage, the majority declared: “The 
Government physically occupied private property [i.e., Jones’s vehicle] for the purpose of 
obtaining information. We have no doubt that such a physical intrusion would have been 
considered a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was adopted.” Id. at 
404–05. 
 160. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 717 (1984) (“Warrantless searches are 
presumptively unreasonable . . . .”). 
 161. Jones, 565 U.S. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring).  
 162. Id. at 424–25; see also id. at 430–31 (emphasizing the length of surveillance as critical 
under the Katz test). Again emphasizing the length of surveillance, Justice Alito’s concurrence 
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the use of longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of 
most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy [because] 
[f]or such offenses, society’s expectation has been that law 
enforcement agents and others would not . . . secretly 
monitor and catalogue every single movement of an 
individual’s car for a very long period.163  
For these reasons, the concurring Justices would have ruled that “the 
lengthy monitoring that occurred in this case [i.e., twenty-eight days] 
constituted a search” under the Katz test.164 
Justice Sotomayor wrote separately to express agreement with both 
the majority and the concurrence.165 According to Justice Sotomayor, the 
majority’s trespass-based analysis was sufficient to resolve the case 
because “[t]he Government usurped Jones’ property for the purpose of 
conducting surveillance on him, thereby invading privacy interests long 
afforded . . . Fourth Amendment protection.”166 Justice Sotomayor went 
on to declare, however, that the Fourth Amendment could be violated, 
“even in the absence of a trespass,” under the Katz reasonable expectation 
of privacy framework.167 Applying that framework, Justice Sotomayor 
agreed with the other four concurring Justices that “at the very least, 
‘longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges 
on expectations of privacy.’”168 Accordingly, at least five Justices in 
Jones rejected the notion that a person may never reasonably expect 
privacy in his movements in public and endorsed the view that GPS 
surveillance becomes more intrusive when conducted over a lengthy 
period of time, opinions that will likely impact the developing law of 
employer-initiated GPS tracking.169 
                                                                                                                     
described the issue as “whether respondent’s reasonable expectations of privacy were violated by 
the long-term monitoring of the movements of the vehicle he drove.” Id. at 419. 
 163. Id. at 430. 
 164. Id. at 430, 431. Notably, the concurring Justices did not attempt to determine “with 
precision the point at which the tracking of this vehicle became a search,” id. at 430, but declared 
that “the line was surely crossed before the 4-week mark.” Id. 
 165. See id. at 413–14 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  
 166. Id. at 413–14. 
 167. Id. at 414 (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001)). 
 168. Id. at 415. 
 169. See United States v. Garcia-Gonzalez, No. 14-10296-LTS, 2015 WL 5145537, at *7 (D. 
Mass. Sept. 1, 2015) (recognizing “the principle that a momentary observation is not a search,” 
but noting that “the converse of that principle, that a lengthy sustained surveillance at some point 
becomes a search, is precisely the point made by Justice Alito’s concurrence in the judgment [in 
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C.  How Jones Impacts Employers 
Jones impacts the legality of GPS tracking by employers in a number 
of ways. First, in unanimously rejecting the GPS tracking decisions 
preceding Jones, in which most courts had refused to extend Fourth 
Amendment protection to this investigative technique,170 the Jones ruling 
revealed a Court concerned by the potential for mass surveillance 
inherent in this form of investigation, with an acute concern for longer 
term monitoring of a person’s otherwise private affairs.171 Although 
Jones dealt with the tracking of a single suspected drug dealer,172 the 
Court’s concerns regarding mass surveillance centered on the potential to 
track ordinary, law-abiding citizens on no suspicion of wrongdoing. 
Several Justices voiced this concern during oral argument in Jones. For 
example, Chief Justice Roberts inquired: “You think there would also not 
be a search [i.e., the Fourth Amendment would not apply] if you put a 
GPS device on all of our cars, monitored our movements for a month? 
You think you’re entitled to do that under your theory?”173 Expressing a 
similar concern, Justice Ginsburg inquired:  
[T]he government’s position would mean that any of us 
could be monitored whenever we leave our homes. So, the 
only thing secure is the home. Is—I mean, that is—that is 
the end point of [the Government’s] argument, that an 
electronic device, as long as it’s not used inside the house, is 
okay.174  
This overall sentiment, especially considering that no member of the 
Court sided with the Government in Jones, reveals that the current Court 
might not look favorably upon any instance of mass surveillance, 
particularly where the surveillance involves the GPS monitoring of 
numerous individuals in the absence of individualized suspicion of 
wrongdoing. This would likely be true in the employment context as well 
unless, as outlined below, an employer conducts such surveillance for a 
legitimate business reason unique to that employer.175  
                                                                                                                     
 170. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 408–10. 
 171. See id. at 430–31 (Alito, J., concurring); see also id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  
 172. See id. at 402 (majority opinion) (describing the suspect as someone who the police 
suspected was “trafficking in narcotics”). 
 173. Transcript of Oral Argument at 9, Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (No. 10-1259), 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2011/10-1259.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WS8K-TAT7].  
 174. Id. at 12.  
 175. Recall that O’Connor v. Ortega requires that any search or seizure by a public employer 
be both reasonable at its inception and reasonable in scope. 480 U.S. 709, 725–26 (1987). 
Moreover, to be reasonable at its inception, O’Connor requires an employer to have “reasonable 
grounds for suspecting” that the employer’s search will turn up evidence that the employee is 
 
26
Florida Law Review, Vol. 70, Iss. 6 [2019], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol70/iss6/3
2018] GPS AND CELL PHONE TRACKING OF EMPLOYEES 1291 
 
Second, and relatedly, it is doubtful that the employment context 
would alter the Court’s analysis with respect to the threshold question of 
whether a Fourth Amendment search had occurred. As noted, a majority 
of Justices in Jones agreed that the placement of a GPS tracking device 
on a suspect’s vehicle and use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s 
movements constitutes a Fourth Amendment search under the physical 
trespass test,176 and for that reason courts reviewing instances of GPS 
tracking by employers have had no difficulty finding that a search occurs 
upon a similar trespassory invasion of a public employee’s vehicle.177 
Accordingly, any instance of GPS tracking carried out by a public 
employer by means of trespass would almost certainly constitute a Fourth 
Amendment “search” and would thus turn on the reasonableness of that 
action under the reasonableness test espoused in O’Connor.  
Third, when GPS tracking is accomplished in the absence of a 
trespass, Jones clearly indicates that the Katz reasonable expectation of 
privacy test controls,178 and there is no reason to believe this test would 
not apply for non-trespassory forms of location tracking in the 
employment context, where the Katz test has been applied often.179 Thus, 
the question becomes whether, and under what exact circumstances, a 
reasonable expectation of privacy would exist in the event an employee’s 
                                                                                                                     
guilty of work-related misconduct, or that the search is necessary for a noninvestigatory work-
related purpose. Id. at 726. Although public employers should be afforded “wide latitude” to 
conduct such searches for “work-related, noninvestigatory reasons,” id. at 723, the employer must 
still be able to point to “reasonable grounds for suspecting” the search is necessary in a given case, 
even where the search is conducted for a noninvestigatory work-related purpose, see id. at 725–
26, which is the most likely instance in which mass surveillance would be used by an employer. 
See infra note 318 and accompanying text. 
 176. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 404. 
 177. See, e.g., Cunningham v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Labor, 997 N.E.2d 468, 471–72 (N.Y. 
2013) (applying the physical trespass test, as espoused in Jones, to find a “search” had occurred 
when a public employer attached a GPS device to an employee’s vehicle and later used the device 
to monitor the vehicle’s movements). 
 178. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 411 (“Situations involving merely the transmission of electronic 
signals without trespass would remain subject to Katz analysis.”); see also id. at 415 (Sotomayor, 
J., concurring) (“But ‘[s]ituations involving merely the transmission of electronic signals without 
trespass would remain subject to Katz analysis.’” (alteration in original)); id. at 430–31 (Alito, J., 
concurring) (arguing that the Jones majority erred in reviving the trespass test and suggesting that 
all “search” questions should be governed exclusively by Katz). 
 179. See, e.g., O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 715–19 (analyzing whether an employee of a public 
hospital could reasonably expect privacy in his office); United States v. Barrows, 481 F.3d 1246, 
1247 (10th Cir. 2007) (analyzing whether the plaintiff–employee could reasonably expect privacy 
in a personal computer he used at work); United States v. Yudong Zhu, 23 F. Supp. 3d 234, 237 
(S.D.N.Y. 2014) (considering whether an employee could reasonably expect privacy in his work 
computer); K-Mart Corp. Store No. 7441 v. Trotti, 677 S.W.2d 632, 635–36 (Tex. App. 1984) 
(analyzing whether a search had occurred under Katz by considering whether the employee-
plaintiff could reasonably expect privacy in her workplace locker). 
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movements are tracked in the absence of a trespass180—most notably, 
where an employee’s location is determined through a GPS-enabled cell 
phone181 or smartphone app.182 In Jones, five Justices expressed the view 
that “longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses 
impinges on expectations of privacy.”183 Although the concurring 
Justices were speaking in terms of criminal “offenses,” the Justices 
reached this result because “society’s expectation has been that law 
enforcement agents and others would not . . . secretly monitor and 
catalogue every single movement of an individual’s car for a very long 
period.”184 Although it is unclear who these “others” referenced in the 
above quote might include, it is at least plausible that the concurring 
Justices deliberately left room to rein in the actions of other government 
actors, such as public employers, with respect to GPS monitoring. Indeed, 
the Court has repeatedly deemed the Fourth Amendment applicable to all 
types of government actors, including employers.185  
Finally, if the concurring opinions in Jones are a guide, then length of 
surveillance may become important in any Katz-based analysis of 
employee tracking, particularly as it pertains to the scope of that 
surveillance.186 According to the five concurring Justices in Jones, 
tracking a person’s vehicle via GPS for twenty-eight days constituted a 
search under the Katz test (and hence a Fourth Amendment violation due 
to the lack of a valid warrant or applicable warrant exception).187 These 
                                                                                                                     
 180. Some courts have described Jones as signaling “a particular concern for government 
trespass upon the areas (‘persons, houses, papers, and effects’) [the Fourth Amendment] 
enumerates.” United States v. Figueroa-Cruz, 914 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1260 (N.D. Ala. 2012) 
(alteration in original) (quoting Jones, 565 U.S. at 406).  
 181. See, e.g., United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 779–80 (6th Cir. 2012). In a case 
where law enforcement “pinged” a suspect’s phone to determine its location, the court 
distinguished Jones on the grounds that “[n]o such physical intrusion [of the suspect’s phone] 
occurred in [this] case. [The suspect] himself obtained the cell phone for the purpose of 
communication, and that phone included the GPS technology used to track the phone’s 
whereabouts.” Id.  
 182. See infra notes 346–49 and accompanying text. 
 183. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring); see also id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring).  
 184. Id. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 185. See supra notes 15–18 and accompanying text. 
 186. Many lower courts post-Jones have applied Katz in cases where no trespass has 
occurred. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 903 N.W.2d 101, 109–10 (S.D. 2017) (“But this case does not 
concern a physical trespass; therefore, the Katz analysis controls [due to the opinions expressed 
in Jones].”). In addition, courts have recognized that length of surveillance is a critical factor in 
such a case. Cf. United States v. Patrick, 842 F.3d 540, 544 (7th Cir. 2016) (“If a cell-site simulator 
is like a GPS tracker, and if the approach of the concurring opinions in Jones is adopted, then it 
would be necessary to know how long the police used a simulator while searching for Patrick and 
just how accurate is the location information it provides.”). 
 187. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  
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Justices did not identify the precise point at which the tracking became a 
search, but simply declared that “the line was surely crossed before the 
4-week mark.”188 As a result, criminal suspects—–and perhaps 
government employees as well—–can arguably expect not to be tracked 
by GPS for such a lengthy period of time.189 At the other end of the 
spectrum, the Court’s prior holding in United States v. Knotts190 suggests 
that a person traveling on public roads for just a few hours cannot 
reasonably expect privacy in those movements,191 a decision Jones was 
careful not to overrule.192 In the wake of Jones, the line between these 
two points remains unclear,193 and, as explained below, is an issue that 
resurfaces in cases involving GPS tracking by employers—albeit under 
the separate question of whether an employer investigation is reasonable 
in scope.194 With these principles in mind, this Article next examines 
instances of GPS tracking by employers. 
III.  GPS TRACKING BY EMPLOYERS 
As noted, the Supreme Court in O’Connor adopted rules governing 
both investigations of work-related misconduct and searches conducted 
                                                                                                                     
 188. Id. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring); see also id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) 
(agreeing with the Alito concurrence that “at the very least, ‘longer term GPS monitoring in 
investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy’”). 
 189. See United States v. Garcia-Gonzalez, No. 14-10296-LTS, 2015 WL 5145537, at *4 (D. 
Mass. Sept. 1, 2015) (“When considering the legality under the Fourth Amendment of long-term 
video surveillance of an individual’s activities or home, unquestionably the various opinions 
issued by the Justices in Jones require serious and careful consideration.”). 
 190. 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
 191. Id. at 281–82, 285. In Knotts, the Court upheld the warrantless use of a beeper to track 
a drum of chloroform from the defendant’s point of purchase to a cabin about 100 miles away. Id. 
at 285. According to the Court, the use of the beeper did not constitute a “search” because the 
beeper did not provide any information police could not have obtained through visual surveillance 
along the vehicle’s route. Id. at 281–82. Just one year after Knotts, the Court in United States v. 
Karo examined a similar case and reached the opposite result as in Knotts, primarily because the 
beeper in that case was used to track a can of ether inside a private residence. United States v. 
Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714–15 (1984). 
 192. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 409 (distinguishing Knotts as a case where the Court’s trespass 
concerns did not apply because “[t]he beeper had been placed in the container before it came into 
Knotts’ possession, with the consent of the then-owner”); see also United States v. Figueroa-Cruz, 
914 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1268 (N.D. Ala. 2012) (noting that Jones did not overrule Knotts, but rather 
distinguished it based on “the ownership or exclusivity of use of the chattel” at issue). 
 193. See United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 780 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Justice Alito’s 
concurrence and the majority in Jones both recognized that there is little precedent for what 
constitutes a level of comprehensive tracking that would violate the Fourth Amendment.”). 
 194. See, e.g., Cunningham v. N.Y. Dep’t of Labor, 997 N.E.2d 468, 473 (N.Y. 2013) 
(striking down an instance of GPS tracking by an employer due to its duration). 
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for noninvestigatory work-related purposes.195 This section addresses 
employer use of GPS tracking in both scenarios. 
A.  GPS Tracking on an Individualized Basis to Investigate 
Employee Wrongdoing 
Jones was decided in January 2012.196 Two years later, the Court of 
Appeals of New York applied Jones to an instance of GPS tracking 
conducted by the State of New York in its capacity as an employer.197 
The opinion is significant because, although it applied the Jones 
majority’s trespass-based test to the initial “search” question and found 
an obvious search on facts similar to Jones,198 it ultimately declared the 
search unlawful due to its duration.199 
The employee in the New York case, Michael Cunningham, became 
a state employee in 1980.200 In 2008, suspecting that Cunningham was 
submitting false time sheets and taking unauthorized absences from work, 
the New York State Department of Labor (the Department) attached a 
GPS device to Cunningham’s car, without his knowledge, while the car 
was parked in a lot near the Department’s offices.201 The device was then 
used to track the vehicle’s movements for thirty days, including evenings, 
weekends, and several days when Cunningham was on vacation in 
another state.202 GPS information showed that Cunningham’s arrival and 
departure times from work were not consistent with the number of hours 
he claimed on his time sheets.203 On the strength of this and other 
evidence,204 the Department brought thirteen charges of misconduct 
against Cunningham,205 eight of which were dependent on evidence 
obtained from the GPS device.206 Cunningham then sought to suppress 
                                                                                                                     
 195. See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 723 (1987). 
 196. Jones, 565 U.S. at 400. 
 197. Cunningham, 997 N.E.2d at 470–71, 475. 
 198. See id. at 475. 
 199. See id. at 473. 
 200. Id. at 470 (stating that in 2008, the New York State Department of Labor conducted an 
initial investigation of Cunningham which resulted in a two-month suspension, and that during 
this investigation, Cunningham successfully eluded an investigator who was following his car, 
prompting the Department to contact the Office of the State Inspector General about the matter, 
which then conducted an independent investigation of Cunningham). 
 201. Id.  
 202. Id.  
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. (stating that as part of the investigation, the state Inspector General conducted 
surveillance of an apartment building Cunningham was suspected of visiting during working 
hours, obtained subpoenas for E-ZPass records, and interviewed Cunningham and his secretary). 
 205. Cunningham v. N.Y. Dep’t of Labor, 933 N.Y.S.2d 432, 434 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011), 
rev’d, 997 N.E.2d 468 (N.Y. 2013). 
 206. Cunningham, 997 N.E.2d at 470. 
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the GPS evidence, but the Hearing Officer overseeing his administrative 
proceeding denied the motion.207 The Hearing Officer then found enough 
proof to sustain eleven of the thirteen charges and recommended 
termination of Cunningham’s employment, which occurred shortly 
thereafter.208 
Cunningham appealed his termination in court, arguing that the GPS 
tracking of his vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment such that the data 
obtained from that surveillance should have been suppressed.209 
Applying Jones, the court first held that the GPS tracking of 
Cunningham’s vehicle was a search under the Fourth Amendment.210 
However, the court declared (correctly) that Jones did not resolve the 
separate question of “when, if ever, a GPS search is permissible in the 
absence of a search warrant,” recognizing further that the employment-
specific framework set forth in O’Connor v. Ortega would govern.211  
As in O’Connor, the court determined that the warrant requirement 
does not apply in the employment context, such that the failure to secure 
a warrant before attaching the GPS device to Cunningham’s car was not 
dispositive.212 Nevertheless, the court deemed the search unreasonable.213 
Applying the O’Connor framework, the court deemed the search justified 
at its inception because Cunningham’s employer had “ample grounds to 
suspect him of submitting false time records.”214 However, the court 
deemed the search unreasonable in scope as it involved “excessively 
intrusive,” round-the-clock surveillance of Cunningham’s vehicle,215 
which encompassed “much activity with which the State had no 
legitimate concern—i.e., it tracked [Cunningham] on all evenings, on all 
weekends and on vacation[,]” capturing a great deal of purely private 
activity.216 
In the most striking portion of the opinion, the court then addressed 
the fact that no evidence obtained from surveillance conducted outside of 
business hours was used against Cunningham in his disciplinary 
proceeding, and whether, in light of that fact, suppression of GPS data 
                                                                                                                     
 207. Cunningham, 933 N.Y.S.2d at 434. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Brief for Petitioner at 10, Cunningham, 997 N.E.2d 468 (No. 2013-0123). 
 210. Cunningham, 997 N.E.2d at 471. 
 211. Id. (citing O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 722 (1987)) (finding that the New York 
Court of Appeals also applies the O’Connor test to analyze the constitutionality of searches 
conducted by public employers under the New York Constitution). 
 212. Id. at 472. 
 213. Id. at 473. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
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obtained during business hours was necessary.217 On this point, the court 
reasoned: 
Ordinarily, when a search has exceeded its permissible 
scope, the suppression of items found during the permissible 
portion of the search is not required. But we hold that rule to 
be inapplicable to GPS searches like the present one, in light 
of the extraordinary capacity of a GPS device to permit 
“[c]onstant, relentless tracking of anything.” Where an 
employer conducts a GPS search without making a 
reasonable effort to avoid tracking an employee outside of 
business hours, the search as a whole must be considered 
unreasonable. That conclusion concededly requires 
suppression of [all] GPS evidence here. . . .218 
When read in light of Quon (the text message case described in Part 
I.A. above), the New York Court of Appeals’ decision in Cunningham 
seems incorrect, but the decision becomes more defensible when viewed 
through the lens of the concurring opinions in Jones. Both Quon and 
Cunningham involved employer-initiated investigations of potential 
work misconduct by an employee.219 In both cases, the employee was 
either deemed or assumed to have a legitimate expectation of privacy 
under the circumstances of the case, making the reasonableness of the 
employer’s actions the controlling issue.220 Moreover, the courts in both 
cases ruled that the employer’s investigatory action was reasonable at its 
inception given the employer’s reasonable suspicion that the search 
would uncover evidence of work misconduct.221 The opinions thus 
differed only on the final step of the O’Connor analysis: whether the 
employer’s investigatory conduct was reasonable in scope.222  
In Quon, a Supreme Court opinion that should control Fourth 
Amendment employer-search cases like Cunningham, the Court deemed 
the review of the employee’s text messages reasonable in scope because 
of the limited nature of the review, including the fact that evidence of the 
employee’s activities while off duty was redacted from his disciplinary 
proceedings.223 Arguably the same result should have been reached in 
Cunningham, as the data obtained from the times when Cunningham was 
                                                                                                                     
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. at 473 (citations omitted) (citing United States v. Martell, 654 F.2d 1356, 1361 (9th 
Cir. 1981); United States v. Clark, 891 F.2d 501, 505 (4th Cir. 1989); Boyd v. Constantine, 613 
N.E.2d 511, 511 (N.Y. 1993)). 
 219. City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 750 (2010); Cunningham, 997 N.E.2d at 470. 
 220. Quon, 560 U.S. at 750; Cunningham, 997 N.E.2d at 472. 
 221. Quon, 560 U.S. at 761; Cunningham, 997 N.E.2d at 473. 
 222. Quon, 560 U.S. at 761; Cunningham, 997 N.E.2d at 473. 
 223. Quon, 560 U.S. at 762. 
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off duty had been redacted from his disciplinary proceedings.224 Yet, the 
Cunningham court did not follow Quon on this point, and instead deemed 
the search unreasonable in its entirety.225 The Cunningham court’s 
departure from Quon is likely due to the same underlying concerns with 
respect to GPS tracking that troubled the concurring Justices in Jones—
namely, the potential for GPS tracking to unveil vast amounts of private 
information that realistically could not be obtained through traditional 
means of surveillance, such as trailing a vehicle turn-by-turn.226 For 
employers, then, the obvious lesson from Cunningham is to limit their 
use of GPS tracking to investigations of employees that are based on a 
reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing, and to avoid collecting GPS data 
not truly necessary to corroborate that suspicion.  
From an employer perspective, the most important issue with respect 
to GPS tracking of an employee concerns the permissible length of 
surveillance, as there is no doubt that in light of Jones, GPS tracking by 
way of surreptitiously installed GPS triggers Fourth Amendment 
protection.227 As courts and commentators have recognized, the Supreme 
Court in Jones did not resolve the question of whether long-term GPS 
surveillance is unconstitutional, particularly in cases where GPS tracking 
is accomplished in the absence of a trespass.228 In the employment 
                                                                                                                     
 224. Cunningham, 997 N.E.2d at 473. 
 225.  Id. 
 226. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415–16 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“GPS 
monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record of a person’s public movements that 
reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual 
associations. . . . The government can store such records and efficiently mine them for information 
years into the future.”); see also Cunningham, 997 N.E.2d at 474 (Abdus-Salaam, J., concurring) 
(recognizing that GPS is vastly more intrusive than simply following a car, and stating that “GPS 
is not a mere enhancement of human sensory capacity,” given that it permits tracking and data 
capture over “a practically unlimited period,” and that “[t]he potential for a similar capture of 
information or ‘seeing’ by law enforcement would require, at a minimum, millions of additional 
police officers and cameras on every street lamp” (quoting People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 
1199 (N.Y. 2009))). 
 227. Jones, 565 U.S. at 404. 
 228. See id. at 412 (“It may be that achieving the same result through electronic means, 
without an accompanying trespass, is an unconstitutional invasion of privacy, but the present case 
does not require us to answer that question.”); see also United States v. Garcia-Gonzalez, No. 14-
10296-LTS, 2015 WL 5145537, at *3 (D. Mass. Sept. 1, 2015) (recognizing that legality of 
longer-term video surveillance of an individual’s home or activities was not resolved in Jones); 
United States v. Brooks, 911 F. Supp. 2d 836, 842 (D. Ariz. 2012) (recognizing that Jones left 
open for “some future case” the question whether the Supreme Court “is willing to accept the 
principle that Government surveillance can implicate an individual’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy over time”); State v. Jones, 903 N.W.2d 101, 113 (S.D. 2017) (“[T]his case concerns long-
term, remote surveillance, and there is no controlling law on that question.”); Carniol v. N.Y.C. 
Taxi & Limousine Comm’n, 975 N.Y.S.2d 842, 849 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013) (“[T]he Court [in Jones] 
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context, this same length-of-surveillance issue resurfaces in the question 
of what makes an instance of GPS tracking unreasonable in scope.229  
Although the following proposals will be outlined more fully below, 
for instances in which employees are suspected of work-related 
misconduct, this Article proposes that the best approach for employers to 
follow—one that accounts for the concerns of the concurring Justices in 
Jones and of the entire Cunningham court—is to track an employee via 
GPS only as a means of corroborating an allegation of serious employee 
misconduct. Even then, an employer should utilize this technique only 
after exhausting alternative investigation methods, and only to the extent 
necessary to justify an adverse employment action against the offending 
employee. To further account for the concerns of the Cunningham court, 
which emphasized the need for an employer to “mak[e] a reasonable 
effort to avoid tracking an employee outside of business hours,”230 an 
employer should seek to avoid uncovering purely private activity 
unconnected to work obligations by, for example, shutting off the GPS 
tracking device during nonworking hours. Finally, from a temporal 
standpoint, the employer should only track an employee’s vehicle long 
enough to obtain the information necessary to corroborate a suspicion of 
wrongdoing. 
Borrowed from the criminal context, this proposed framework finds 
support in the Supreme Court’s framework for elevating an allegation of 
wrongdoing through corroboration of an informant’s tip, one that if 
applied by employers, would minimize their potential liability by limiting 
the intrusiveness of this investigative device.  
The Supreme Court’s corroboration-based framework derives largely 
from its decision in Illinois v. Gates,231 which the Court applied in the 
context of establishing probable cause232 and expanded, in Alabama v. 
White,233 to encompass circumstances where the lesser standard of 
reasonable suspicion is required to conduct a less intrusive search or 
seizure.234 The investigations in both Gates and White began with a tip 
from an anonymous informant.235 Because an anonymous informant’s tip 
                                                                                                                     
merely determined that such GPS monitoring was a search but it did not address whether the 
search was reasonable.”), aff’d, 2 N.Y.S.3d 337 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015). 
 229. See Cunningham, 997 N.E.2d at 473 (deeming an instance of GPS tracking by an 
employer unreasonable due to its duration). 
 230. Id.  
 231. 462 U.S. 213, 246 (1983). 
 232. See id. at 230. 
 233. 496 U.S. 325 (1990). 
 234. See id. at 328–29. 
 235. Gates, 462 U.S. at 225; White, 496 U.S. at 326–27. 
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is usually insufficient to establish probable cause,236 police must typically 
corroborate certain aspects of the tip in order to conduct a more extensive 
search or seizure via warrant.237  
Prior to Gates and White, Supreme Court precedent had been read to 
require police to ascertain both the tipster’s “basis of 
knowledge”(typically consisting of details regarding exactly how the 
tipster obtained the provided information) as well as his or her “veracity” 
or “reliability”(usually established through evidence that the informant is 
credible or reliable).238 Abandoning that so-called “two-pronged test,” 
the Court in Gates ruled that probable cause could be established via an 
informant’s tip through a “totality of the circumstances” approach,239 one 
that accounts for the fact that “[i]nformants’ tips . . . come in many 
shapes and sizes”240 and ultimately recognizes that a deficiency in either 
the “reliability” or “basis of knowledge” prong may be compensated for 
by a strong showing as to the other, or even by some other indicia of 
reliability.241 The Court noted, for example, that if a particular informant 
is known for the unusual reliability of his predictions of certain types of 
illegal activity, his failure to thoroughly explain the basis of his 
knowledge in a particular case should not serve as an absolute bar to a 
finding of probable cause based on the tip.242  
The true significance of Gates, insofar as employers are concerned, is 
the Court’s recognition of the vital role that independent corroboration of 
an allegation of wrongdoing plays in developing the suspicion necessary 
to conduct a Fourth Amendment search or seizure.243 As the Gates Court 
recognized, ordinary persons “generally do not provide extensive 
recitations of the basis of their everyday observations,” and “the veracity 
of persons supplying anonymous tips is by hypothesis largely unknown, 
and unknowable,” yet many of those tips, “particularly when 
supplemented by independent police investigation,” are necessary tools 
for solving “otherwise ‘perfect crimes.’”244 From there, the Court readily 
determined that independent corroboration of the details of an 
                                                                                                                     
 236. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 227 (agreeing that standing alone, the anonymous letter sent to 
the police in that case would not provide the basis for a magistrate’s determination that probable 
cause existed). 
 237. See id. at 241–46 (discussing the importance of corroboration). 
 238. Id. at 227–29 (discussing the Illinois Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Court’s prior 
precedent on this issue: Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), abrogated by Gates, 462 
U.S. 213; Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), abrogated by Gates, 462 U.S. 213). 
 239. Gates, 462 U.S. at 230, 238. 
 240. Id. at 232. 
 241. Id. at 214, 233. 
 242. Id. at 233. 
 243. Id. at 241. 
 244. Id. at 237–38. 
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informant’s tip could elevate a facially deficient allegation of wrongdoing 
into one that rises to the level of probable cause.245 
More relevant to the employment context, which dispenses with the 
requirement of probable cause, the Gates corroboration framework was 
later expanded to cases involving reasonable suspicion, a lesser standard 
of suspicion often applied in the employment context.246 The Court 
considered this issue in Alabama v. White.247  
In White, an anonymous informant called police and stated that a 
person named Vanessa White would be leaving a specific apartment 
(235-C) in a specific apartment building (235), at a specific time, in a 
brown Plymouth station wagon with a broken right taillight; the 
informant added that White would then drive to a certain motel in 
possession of an ounce of cocaine in a brown attaché case.248 Officers 
went immediately to the apartment building and observed a station wagon 
that fit the informant’s description.249 Officers then saw a woman exit 
apartment building 235, but, they did not verify exactly which apartment 
unit the woman exited from.250 Further, the officers did not observe a 
brown attaché case; the woman appeared empty-handed.251 At this point, 
the woman entered the station wagon and began to drive in the direction 
of the motel specified by the informant.252 Officers stopped the station 
wagon before it reached the motel and informed the driver, White, that 
she had been stopped because she was suspected of carrying cocaine in 
the vehicle.253 Officers then obtained White’s consent to search the 
vehicle, where they found a brown attaché case, which they opened with 
her consent.254 Inside the case, officers discovered marijuana, prompting 
White’s arrest on marijuana charges.255  
In her ensuing prosecution, White argued that the brief investigatory 
stop of her vehicle was unsupported by reasonable suspicion, such that 
the marijuana found in her vehicle had to be suppressed.256 When White’s 
Fourth Amendment claim reached the Supreme Court, the Court 
addressed the issue of whether the corroborated tip “exhibited sufficient 
                                                                                                                     
 245. Id. at 241–44. 
 246. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
 247. 496 U.S. 325, 328–29 (1990). 
 248. Id. at 327. 
 249. Id.  
 250. See id.  
 251. Id.  
 252. Id.  
 253. Id.  
 254. Id.  
 255. Id.  
 256. See White v. State, 550 So. 2d 1074, 1075, 1079 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989), writ denied, 
550 So. 2d 1081 (Ala. 1989), and rev’d, 496 U.S. 325 (1990). 
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indicia of reliability to provide reasonable suspicion” to stop White’s 
vehicle.257 Although this particular investigatory stop required only 
reasonable suspicion, rather than probable cause,258 the Court analyzed 
the issue using the same corroboration-based framework used in Gates.259  
Similar to the tip in Gates, the Court noted that the tip in White 
provided virtually no information regarding the tipster’s reliability, nor 
did it provide any indication of the basis for the tipster’s knowledge 
regarding White’s criminal activities.260 As such, the tip alone would not 
have justified the Terry stop of White’s vehicle.261 Yet, as in Gates, police 
corroborated many aspects of the tip, including the fact that a vehicle 
fitting the tipster’s description was parked outside the described 
apartment building; a woman fitting the tipster’s description came out of 
the specified apartment building (rather than the particular apartment); 
the woman got into the car and drove in the direction of the motel, as the 
tipster had predicted; and this all occurred within the time frame specified 
by the informant.262  
This corroboration of seemingly innocent details is significant, in the 
Court’s words, “because [if] an informant is shown to be right about some 
things, he is probably right about other facts that he has alleged, including 
the claim that the object of the tip is engaged in criminal activity.”263 This 
corroboration, therefore, “imparted some degree of reliability to the other 
allegations made by the caller.”264 In addition, the Court noted that 
although the tip in White was not as detailed as the one in Gates, and 
although the corroboration was not as complete in White as in Gates, the 
required degree of suspicion in White—reasonable suspicion as opposed 
to probable cause—was also not as high.265 Finally, the Court emphasized 
that, in White, as in Gates, the tip included details regarding the suspect’s 
future actions not easily predicted by members of the general public who 
do not possess “inside information” about the suspect’s future affairs. 
This information included the fact that White would shortly leave the 
apartment building, get in the car, and drive in the direction of the 
motel.266 This accurate prediction of White’s future activities thus made 
                                                                                                                     
 257. White, 496 U.S. at 326–27. 
 258. Id. at 328 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). 
 259. See id. at 328–29. 
 260. Id. at 329. 
 261. Id. (“Simply put, a tip such as this one, standing alone, would not ‘“warrant a man of 
reasonable caution in the belief” that [a stop] was appropriate.’” (alteration in original) (quoting 
Terry, 392 U.S. at 22)).  
 262. Id. at 331. 
 263. Id. (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 244 (1983)).  
 264. Id. at 332. 
 265. Id. at 329. 
 266. Id. at 332. 
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it “reasonable for police to believe that a person with access to such 
information is likely to also have access to reliable information about that 
individual’s illegal activities.”267 In the end, such corroboration of an 
otherwise deficient tip gave police “reason to believe not only that the 
caller was honest but also that he was well informed, at least well enough 
to justify the stop.”268  
In the employment context, similar to cases like Gates and White, 
allegations of employee wrongdoing are often initiated by laypersons 
rather than professional investigators, and are then investigated further by 
company officials.269 For relatively small employers, these complainants 
may be “known” to the investigating officials, and although this may not 
be the case may not be in larger corporations, in either event 
complainants’ “reliability” and “basis of knowledge” will often be central 
to the investigation.270 Such a scenario may arise, for example, in 
workplace harassment cases, and may also arise in other instances of 
alleged employee wrongdoing that might prompt an investigator to utilize 
methods of employee tracking, such as falsifying time sheets.271  
Although an informant’s reliability and basis of knowledge will not 
always be at issue in the employment context, the important point is that 
when an investigation is initiated based upon the report of an aggrieved 
coworker or customer, or even based upon an anonymous individual’s 
complaint, the corroboration principles espoused in cases like Gates and 
White would serve as a useful guide to employers.  
For investigations of alleged workplace misconduct, this Article 
proposes that to be reasonable at its inception, an employer should track 
an employee by surreptitiously installed GPS only if the employee under 
investigation has allegedly committed a terminable offense, and only if 
the employer has been unable to corroborate an allegation of employee 
wrongdoing through some other means. Finally, this Article proposes that 
                                                                                                                     
 267. Id. 
 268. Id. 
 269. See, e.g., Leventhal v. Knapek, 266 F.3d 64, 68 (2d Cir. 2001) (analyzing an employer 
search of an employee’s workplace computer to investigate alleged workplace misconduct first 
reported by an anonymous informant); see also Smith v. White, 666 F. Supp. 1085, 1089–90 
(E.D. Tenn. 1987), aff’d, 857 F.2d 1475 (6th Cir. 1988) (recognizing that in an employment 
context,“[r]easonable suspicion may be based on statements made by other employees and tips 
from informants”). 
 270. See, e.g., Benavidez v. City of Albuquerque, 101 F.3d 620, 625 (10th Cir. 1996) 
(discussing a challenge to a known informant’s reliability in the context of establishing the 
reasonable suspicion necessary to perform employment-related drug tests); Reeves v. Singleton, 
994 S.W.2d 586, 592 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (finding no reasonable suspicion based on an 
uncorroborated anonymous tip identifying plaintiff-employee as a drug user).  
 271. See generally Greer v. McCormick, No. 14-CV-13596, 2017 WL 1315718, at *15–20 
(E.D. Mich. Apr. 10, 2017) (discussing the importance of corroborating an anonymous 
informant’s tip in the employment context). 
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this form of GPS tracking should be limited to scenarios where it would 
be reasonable to believe that tracking the employee would in fact 
corroborate a report of employee wrongdoing. For example, if an 
employee is reported to have harassed a coworker at work, tracking the 
alleged wrongdoer outside of work would not be reasonable. If, however, 
an employee is reported to have harassed a coworker by stalking her after 
work hours at a local gym, GPS tracking might be a reasonable means of 
corroborating those allegations.272 In combination, these requirements 
will ensure that employees suspected of committing relatively minor 
offenses are not subjected to this intrusive form of investigation, which 
will only be used by an employer when truly necessary. 
Regarding the separate O’Connor requirement of being reasonable in 
scope, this Article proposes that once employed, GPS tracking of an 
employee should avoid uncovering purely private activity unconnected 
to work obligations or alleged workplace misconduct and should not 
extend any longer than truly necessary to corroborate the suspected 
wrongdoing. These principles are embedded in cases like Quon and 
Cunningham, which emphasize the obligation of employers to limit the 
scope of any employer-initiated investigation pursuant to the framework 
set forth in O’Connor v. Ortega,273 and Jones, which reflects an acute 
concern for limiting the duration of such highly-invasive GPS tracking. 
In sum, employers should consider surreptitious GPS tracking an ill-
suited means of investigating most instances of employee wrongdoing. 
And even where the method may be appropriate, employers should utilize 
this highly intrusive investigative technique only as a last resort, and only 
insofar as is truly necessary to corroborate an allegation of serious 
misconduct.  
Although the above proposals apply to employees’ personal vehicles, 
this framework should generally remain the same when an employee is 
tracked in a company-owned vehicle via surreptitiously installed GPS. 
Although it is true that expectations of privacy in the employment context 
may shift depending on who owns the property subject to intrusion,274 
                                                                                                                     
 272. Cf. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-48d(b)(2) (2018) (establishing an exception to a statutory 
requirement that an employer must provide written notice to any potentially affected employees 
prior to engaging in electronic monitoring on the employer’s premises for situations “[w]hen (A) 
an employer has reasonable grounds to believe that employees are engaged in conduct which (i) 
violates the law, (ii) violates the legal rights of the employer or the employer’s employees, or (iii) 
creates a hostile workplace environment, and (B) electronic monitoring may produce evidence of 
this misconduct, the employer may conduct monitoring without giving prior written notice”). 
 273. See City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 761–63 (2010); Cunningham v. N.Y. Dep’t 
of Labor, 997 N.E.2d 468, 472–73 (N.Y. 2013). 
 274. See, e.g., United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 2000) (finding no 
legitimate expectation of privacy in employee’s Internet use when employer’s known policy 
allowed monitoring of “all file transfers, all websites visited, and all e-mail messages”); United 
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this factor will more likely alter the outcome when ownership is 
accompanied by notice and employee consent.275 Notice and consent are 
not present, however, when a GPS device is secretly used to track an 
employee through the type of surreptitious installation that occurred in 
Cunningham and Jones.276 
When notice and consent are present, courts have rejected privacy-
based claims where an employer attaches a GPS tracking device to an 
employer-owned vehicle and uses that device to track the vehicle’s 
movements, albeit often in cases not involving investigations of 
individual employee misconduct, as where an employer’s entire fleet of 
vehicles are tracked via GPS.277 Employer ownership has also played a 
role in cases involving investigations of employee wrongdoing. In one 
such case, Elgin v. St. Louis Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,278 the court granted 
summary judgment to an employer on an intrusion claim that was brought 
against the employer after the employer surreptitiously attached a GPS 
device to its company-owned van, which was driven by the plaintiff, to 
investigate potential employee theft.279 The Elgin court found no 
“substantial intrusion upon [the] plaintiff’s seclusion” because the GPS 
tracker “revealed no more than highly public information as to the van’s 
location.”280 In addition, the court declared that “defendant’s use of the 
tracking device on its own vehicle does not rise to the level of being 
highly offensive to a reasonable person.”281  
                                                                                                                     
States v. Hamilton, 778 F. Supp. 2d 651, 654 (E.D. Va. 2011) (finding that public school employee 
lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mails between him and his wife that were stored 
on his work computer because he was on notice that contents of his computer were subject to 
inspection, which he acknowledged). 
 275. See, e.g., Simons, 206 F.3d at 398 (finding no legitimate expectation of privacy in 
employee’s Internet use when employer’s known policy allowed monitoring of “all file transfers, 
all websites visited, and all e-mail messages”); Hamilton, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 654 (finding that 
public school employee lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mails between him and 
his wife that were stored on his work computer because he was on notice that contents of his 
computer were subject to inspection, which he acknowledged). 
 276. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 403 (2012) (noting that law enforcement 
officers “installed a GPS tracking device on the undercarriage” of a vehicle to track a suspect’s 
movements); Cunningham, 997 N.E.2d at 470 (stating that investigators covertly attached a GPS 
device to an employee’s car). 
 277. See, e.g., Tubbs v. Wynne Transp. Servs. Inc., No. H-06-0360, 2007 WL 1189640, at 
*2, *10 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 19, 2007) (finding no viable invasion of privacy claim where plaintiff’s 
employer-owned commercial truck was outfitted with a GPS device that regularly transmitted the 
truck’s location to the employer, which the employer used to determine whether its drivers were 
exceeding legal limitations on the number of hours they could drive). 
 278. No. 4:05CV970-DJS, 2005 WL 305063 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 14, 2005). 
 279. Id. at *1. 
 280. Id. at *4. 
 281. Id.  
 
40
Florida Law Review, Vol. 70, Iss. 6 [2019], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol70/iss6/3
2018] GPS AND CELL PHONE TRACKING OF EMPLOYEES 1305 
 
The result in Elgin is striking because the employer in that case 
tracked the van driven by the plaintiff in order to investigate cash 
shortages in machines the plaintiff serviced (a potentially criminal 
offense), and did not notify the plaintiff that it had done so until after he 
had been cleared of any wrongdoing,282 such that notice and consent did 
not factor into the court’s decision.283 Nevertheless, because Elgin was 
decided several years before Jones, in an era in which most courts had 
drastically downplayed the privacy concerns inherent in surreptitious 
forms of GPS tracking,284 the case does not compel alteration of the 
framework proposed above. In the end, employer ownership is just one 
of many factors to consider in any given investigation and does not in and 
of itself dictate Fourth Amendment outcomes.285 
B.  GPS Tracking of a Segment of Employees for Legitimate 
Business Reasons 
Having established a framework for employers to follow when 
investigating employee wrongdoing, this Article next examines GPS 
tracking for noninvestigatory work-related purposes.286  
In Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, individualized suspicion is 
generally required to make someone the target of a Fourth Amendment 
search or seizure, particularly when performed as part of a criminal 
investigation.287 Given the historical development of the Fourth 
Amendment right–—which was arguably created to prevent wide-
ranging searches through the use of general warrants288–—so-called 
                                                                                                                     
 282. See id. at *1. 
 283. See id. at *4. 
 284. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.  
 285. Demonstrating that the ownership factor alone does not determine expectations of 
privacy, courts have sometimes ruled that an employee enjoys Fourth Amendment protection in 
an employer-owned device, and on the other hand have found no Fourth Amendment protection 
in a personally-owned device. Compare, e.g., United States v. Barrows, 481 F.3d 1246, 1248–49 
(10th Cir. 2007) (finding employee had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of a 
personal computer he used at work), with, e.g., United States v. Yudong Zhu, 23 F. Supp. 3d 234, 
236, 238–39 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (finding plaintiff could reasonably expect privacy in his work 
computer even though the computer was formally owned by his employer). 
 286. See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 723 (1987) (adopting a framework for analyzing 
searches performed for “either a noninvestigatory work-related” purpose or to investigate 
“suspected work-related employee misfeasance”).  
 287. See, e.g., United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 821–36 (9th Cir. 2004) (discussing 
the requirement of individualized suspicion in Fourth Amendment case law, including cases in 
which the requirement has been abandoned). 
 288. See Tracey Maclin, Let Sleeping Dogs Lie: Why the Supreme Court Should Leave 
Fourth Amendment History Unabridged, 82 B.U. L. REV. 895, 941 (2002) (“Although the [Fourth] 
Amendment's text bans only general warrants, the ‘larger purpose for which the Framers adopted 
the text [was] to curb the exercise of discretionary authority by officers.’” (alteration in original) 
 
41
McAliister: GPS and Cell Phone Tracking of Employees
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2019
1306 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70 
 
“fishing expeditions for evidence” are generally considered 
unconstitutional, particularly those performed without individualized 
suspicion of wrongdoing.289  
Given these fundamental Fourth Amendment principles, any 
employer program that subjects a large segment of employees to 
continual GPS surveillance should be used with caution. Yet, as with 
other “special needs” scenarios involving widespread searches, such as 
airport security screenings, an investigative method is not automatically 
unreasonable simply because it is applied to a large number of individuals 
in the absence of individualized suspicion.290 Given that employer-
initiated searches generally fall into this special needs category, GPS 
tracking of a segment of employees might be reasonable, particularly 
when performed for legitimate “work-related, noninvestigatory reasons” 
apart from any investigation into workplace misconduct, even where the 
data obtained is later used to discipline an individual employee.291 
                                                                                                                     
(quoting Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 
553, 555 (1999)). But see Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. 
REV. 757, 771–72 (1994) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment contains no actual warrant 
requirement and that “at times, the Founders viewed judges and certain judicial proceedings with 
suspicion,” adding that “[t]he Amendment's Warrant Clause does not require, presuppose, or even 
encourage warrants—it limits them” by imposing strict standards on their issuance). Contra 
Davies, at 591–619 (rejecting Amar's reasonableness view of the Fourth Amendment as “based 
in large measure on erroneous historical premises”). 
 289. See Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 560, 566 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
dissenting) (reviewing the purpose of the Fourth Amendment’s warrant clause of protecting 
against general searches and complaining that officers, by their own admission, engaged in a 
“fishing expedition for evidence of unidentified criminal activity committed by unspecified 
persons,” which “was the very evil the Fourth Amendment was intended to prevent”); see also 
Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 220 (1981) (“The central objectionable feature of both 
[the general warrants that had occurred in England and of the writs of assistance used in the 
Colonies] was that they provided no judicial check on the determination of the executing officials 
that the evidence available justified an intrusion into any particular home.”). 
 290. See, e.g., Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997) (“[W]here the risk to public 
safety is substantial and real, blanket suspicionless searches calibrated to the risk may rank as 
‘reasonable’—for example, searches now routine at airports and at entrances to courts and other 
official buildings.”); see also United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 500 (2d Cir. 1974) (“When 
the risk is the jeopardy to hundreds of human lives and millions of dollars of property inherent in 
the pirating or blowing up of a large airplane, the danger alone meets the test of reasonableness, 
so long as the search is conducted in good faith for the purpose of preventing hijacking or like 
damage and with reasonable scope and the passenger has been given advance notice of his liability 
to such a search so that he can avoid it by choosing not to travel by air.” (quoting United States v. 
Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 675 (2d Cir. 1972) (Friendly, C.J., concurring))). 
 291. See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 723 (1987) (stating that the reasonableness 
inquiry would not be particularly rigorous and that public employers should be afforded “wide 
latitude to enter employee offices for work-related, noninvestigatory reasons”). 
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Another recent New York case, Carniol v. The New York City Taxi and 
Limousine Commission,292 illustrates these principles.  
In Carniol, petitioner Robert Carniol sued The New York City Taxi 
and Limousine Commission (TLC), arguing that the city’s use of GPS 
technology to track its taxi drivers violated the New York Constitution, 
and that the fruits of that violation could not be used as evidence in 
disciplinary actions against individual taxi drivers.293 According to 
Carniol’s complaint, the TLC mandated in 2007 that all New York City 
medallion taxi cabs be equipped with a Taxi Technology System (TTS) 
that included a GPS system.294 As originally developed, the intent of the 
TTS system was to collect information for the TLC’s regulatory analysis. 
The goals were to gather data regarding pick-up and drop-off points, to 
assess trip time and distance, to eliminate the need for drivers to complete 
handwritten trip sheets, and to assist in locating a passenger’s lost 
property.295 Given its administrative purposes, the TLC never stated that 
it would use the information it gathered for investigatory purposes.296 
Yet, after receiving complaints that passengers were being overcharged 
by a certain driver, the TLC conducted a comprehensive review of the 
data generated by the TTS system for essentially all of its 42,000 cab 
drivers, including Carniol.297 As a result, the TLC determined that more 
than 21,000 drivers, including Carniol, had overcharged passengers by 
charging the higher out of town rate for trips within New York City.298  
Having determined that Carniol had overcharged passengers ninety-
one times, the TLC commenced an administrative proceeding to revoke 
his TLC license.299 Following a trial, an Administrative Law Judge issued 
a report and recommendation finding Carniol guilty of the charges against 
him and recommending revocation of his license.300 The judge 
specifically found that Carniol had no reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the trip information gathered by the TLC, which had properly searched 
the records it lawfully possessed.301 Shortly thereafter, Carniol’s taxi 
driver’s license was revoked.302  
                                                                                                                     
 292. 975 N.Y.S.2d 842 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013), aff’d, 126 A.D.3d 409 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015).  
 293. Id. at 844. 
 294. Id.  
 295. Id. at 844–45. 
 296. Id. at 845. 
 297. Id.  
 298. Id.  
 299. Id.  
 300. Id.  
 301. Id.  
 302. Id. at 846. 
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Carniol subsequently challenged the revocation, arguing that the 
TLC’s use of GPS tracking violated his Fourth Amendment rights.303 As 
an initial matter, the New York Supreme Court recognized that 
individuals “who choose to participate in a heavily regulated industry, 
such as the taxicab industry, have a diminished expectation of privacy, 
particularly in information related to the goals of the industry 
regulation,”304 such that Carniol could not legitimately expect privacy in 
the trip data that had been gathered by GPS.305  
The court went on to find that even if it assumed that Carniol could 
expect privacy, the TLC’s GPS tracking program would have been 
“reasonable” in light of the competing interests at stake.306 According to 
the court, Carniol’s “privacy interest” in the GPS-generated trip data is 
“minimal,” and the “intrusion is also minimal,” given that “[i]t does not 
involve a physical intrusion into Carniol’s body or home” and does not 
collect data regarding his whereabouts while off-duty.307 When weighed 
against the “substantial” “government interest in improving taxi customer 
service and [the] ability to regulate it by using modern methods to 
promote passenger and driver safety,” the court had no difficulty finding 
the TLC’s actions reasonable.308 Distinguishing Jones, which involved 
the surreptitious and trespassory attachment of a GPS device to a criminal 
suspect’s vehicle, the court further noted that the GPS monitoring here 
was conducted with the knowledge and consent of the taxi driver and 
“was narrowly tailored to achieve a regulatory goal.”309 The court then 
re-emphasized that the GPS system did “not record information about the 
driver’s personal life.”310 Accordingly, even if Carniol could legitimately 
expect privacy in the GPS data, the search would have been reasonable.311  
For purposes of the instant analysis, five things are noteworthy 
regarding Carniol. First, because the GPS system at issue was installed 
with the knowledge and consent of the city’s taxi drivers, the use of that 
system was not governed by Jones, leaving only the question of whether 
a “search” occurred pursuant to the Katz reasonable expectation of 
                                                                                                                     
 303. Id. (noting that Carniol also brought a similar state law claim).  
 304. Id. at 848 (quoting Buliga v. N.Y.C. Taxi Limousine Comm’n, No. 07 Civ. 6507 (DLC), 
2007 WL 4547738, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2007)). 
 305. Id.  
 306. Id. at 848–49 (quoting Buliga, 2007 WL 4547738, at *3). 
 307. Id. at 849. 
 308. Id.  
 309. Id.  
 310. Id.  
 311. Id.  
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privacy test.312 Second, taxi drivers subject to GPS monitoring could not 
reasonably expect privacy under Katz, at least in part because of their 
consent.313 Third, that same consent contributed to the court’s ultimate 
determination that the employer’s wholesale GPS monitoring of its taxi 
drivers was reasonable.314 Fourth, the legitimate government interests at 
issue—to regulate and improve the taxi industry and to enhance the safety 
and convenience of the driver and the passengers—tilted the scale of 
reasonableness in the employer’s direction.315 Finally, the fact that no 
data was collected regarding Carniol’s personal life, including his off 
duty whereabouts, made the GPS surveillance relatively unintrusive, and 
hence more likely to be deemed reasonable.316  
Carniol’s combination of employee consent to the GPS monitoring 
program, the existence of legitimate business purposes necessitating the 
use of GPS, and the employer’s decision not to collect GPS data while 
employees are off duty, are in essence the key guidelines for employers 
to follow in using across-the-board GPS tracking programs. When 
adopted, these ingredients will ensure both that the monitoring remains 
reasonable at its inception (that is, based upon employee consent and 
performed for a legitimate business reason) and reasonable in scope (that 
is, not excessively intrusive given that it does not encompass off-duty 
activity).317 Moreover, Carniol reveals that when an employer tracks an 
entire segment of employees in a reasonable manner through GPS, the 
employer may then utilize the GPS data it acquires to discipline 
individual employees for misconduct that data reveals.318 Quite simply, 
                                                                                                                     
 312. See id.; see also United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 411 (2012) (“Situations involving 
merely the transmission of electronic signals without trespass would remain subject to Katz 
analysis.”). 
 313. Carniol, 975 N.Y.S.2d at 848 (emphasizing that the taxicab industry is heavily 
regulated, which reduces expectations of privacy, and that “the TTS system was installed with the 
knowledge of the taxicab owners and all taxicab drivers are required to follow TLC regulations 
which mandate the use of the TTS system”). 
 314. See id. at 848–49. 
 315. See id. at 849. 
 316. See id.  
 317. See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725–26 (1987). 
 318. See Carniol, 975 N.Y.S.2d at 845–46, 851; see also Tubbs v. Wynne Transp. Servs. 
Inc., No. H-06-0360, 2007 WL 1189640, at *10 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 19, 2007) (finding no viable 
invasion of privacy claim where plaintiff’s employer-owned commercial truck was outfitted with 
a GPS device that regularly transmitted the truck’s location to the employer, which the employer 
used to determine whether its drivers were exceeding legal limitations on the number of hours 
they could drive); Gerardi v. City of Bridgeport, 985 A.2d 328, 330 (Conn. 2010) (involving a 
case, dismissed on unrelated grounds, brought by city fire inspectors who were disciplined for 
improper job performance, “which was detected through the [employers’] use of global 
positioning system devices (GPS devices) without the [employees’] knowledge”). 
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because the GPS tracking itself is not unlawful, the employer’s 
subsequent use of its own GPS data is not unlawful either.319  
The same variables present in Carniol—consent, legitimate business 
reasons, and narrow scope—are, in the author’s view, the necessary 
ingredients of a lawful system of employer-initiated cell phone tracking, 
a topic addressed in the next section. 
IV.  TRACKING EMPLOYEES THROUGH THEIR CELL PHONES 
This section examines the most common types of cell phone tracking 
that exist today. It then considers how employers may use cell phones to 
lawfully track the locations of their employees. 
A.  Cell Phone Tracking Methods 
 The Supreme Court’s ruling in Jones generally requires law 
enforcement to obtain a warrant before attaching a GPS device to a 
suspect’s vehicle as part of a criminal investigation.320 As a result, law 
enforcement officials have turned to more sophisticated methods of 
location tracking, including tracking through cell phones.321 Given that 
law enforcement can typically monitor a cell phone’s location without 
having to commit a trespass upon it, this method of investigation is 
generally subject to fewer constitutional constraints as compared to the 
more traditional form of GPS tracking that occurred in Jones and 
Cunningham.322  
Cell phone tracking by law enforcement comes in two primary forms. 
One common form occurs through the acquisition of cell site location 
data.323 Under this method, which does not involve a trespass,324 police 
                                                                                                                     
 319. See Carniol, 975 N.Y.S.2d at 851 (denying Carniol’s motion in its entirety). 
 320. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012). 
 321. See Jonathan Bard, Unpacking the Dirtbox: Confronting Cell Phone Location Tracking 
with the Fourth Amendment, 57 B.C. L. REV. 731, 744 (2016) (“GPS devices remain a popular 
option for location tracking, but this attachment-based technology presents practical and legal 
obstacles. [As such,] [l]aw enforcement is increasingly turning to cell phone tracking as an 
appealing alternative to attachment-based tracking devices.” (footnote omitted)). 
 322. See Christian Bennardo, The Fourth Amendment, CSLI Tracking, and the Mosaic 
Theory, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2385, 2396–401 (2017) (examining judicial trends in cell site 
location tracking cases). 
 323. See United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 502–03 (11th Cir. 2015) (describing this type 
of data). 
 324. See id. at 514 (distinguishing Jones on this point) (“The government’s obtaining 
MetroPCS records, showing historical cell tower locations, did not involve a physical intrusion 
on private property or a search at all. The records belonged to a private company . . . [and] were 
obtained through a court order authorized by a federal statute, not by means of governmental 
trespass.”); see also United States v. Wheeler, 169 F. Supp. 3d 896, 911 (E.D. Wis. 2016) (“The 
court concludes that the government's collection of cell tower location data from the cell phone 
provider does not constitute a ‘search’ under the Fourth Amendment [because] [t]he collection of 
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are able to obtain cell phone location data by identifying which cell tower 
communicated with the phone when the phone was used to make a call, 
send a text or e-mail, or engage in other data transmission functions.325 
When accumulated over a period of time, such cell site location data— 
which can be incredibly comprehensive given the number of times a 
typical cell phone is used each day—allows a person reviewing the data 
to infer both the phone’s and the user’s location at numerous times 
throughout the day.326 Cell phone companies maintain records of this 
information,327 making it possible for law enforcement to request either 
“historical” or “real-time” cell-site information.328  
With historical cell-site information, law enforcement may request all 
such data accumulated over a period of time in the past, whereas with 
real-time data, law enforcement may seek to obtain this information on a 
real-time basis into the future.329 In one recent robbery investigation, for 
example, the Government obtained 129 days of historical cell-site 
location information from one suspect’s wireless providers. The 
Government then used this information as evidence of the suspect’s 
seemingly incriminating location with respect to four robberies.330  
Prior to June 2018, government officials generally did not need a 
warrant to acquire historical cell-site location data331 as most courts had 
ruled that no Fourth Amendment “search” occurs in that instance, either 
under the trespass test or under the reasonable expectation of privacy 
                                                                                                                     
the data does not involve a trespass upon an individual’s person or property, nor into a physical 
area in which the person has established a reasonable expectation of privacy.”). 
 325. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2212 (2018).  
 326. See id. at 2217–19; see also In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the 
Release of Historical Cell-Site Info., 809 F. Supp. 2d 113, 115 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (“If a user’s cell 
phone has communicated with a particular cell-site, this strongly suggests that the user has 
physically been within the particular cell-site’s geographical range.”). 
 327. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212; In re Application of the U.S. for Historical Cell Site 
Data, 724 F.3d 600, 611–12 (5th Cir. 2013) (“[C]ell site information is clearly a business record 
[because] [t]he cell service provider collects and stores historical cell site data for its own business 
purposes, perhaps to monitor or optimize service on its network or to accurately bill its customers 
for the segments of its network that they use.”); In re Application of the U.S. for an Order 
Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site Info., 809 F. Supp. 2d at 115 (“By technical and 
practical necessity, cell-phone service providers keep historical records of which cell-sites each 
of their users’ cell phones have communicated. The implication of these facts is that cellular 
service providers have records of the geographic location of almost every American at almost 
every time of day and night.”). 
 328. See United States v. Jones, 908 F. Supp. 2d 203, 207 (D.D.C. 2012). 
 329. See id. 
 330. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212–13.  
 331. See In re Application of U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d at 615 (concluding 
that the government can seek judicial orders under the Stored Communications Act to obtain 
historical cell-site information on the basis of reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause). 
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test.332 In finding no legitimate expectation of privacy in such data, most 
courts had invoked the Fourth Amendment’s assumption of risk rationale, 
a principle that there can be no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
information knowingly disclosed to a third party, such as a cell phone 
provider.333  
Overturning many of these decisions, in June 2018, the United States 
Supreme Court refused to apply the assumption of risk doctrine to 
historical cell-site location data in Carpenter v. United States.334 It held 
that “an individual maintains a legitimate expectation of privacy in the 
record of his physical movements as captured through [cell-site location 
information],”335 such that a Fourth Amendment search occurred when 
the FBI obtained detailed location information from a criminal suspect’s 
wireless carriers.336 The Carpenter Court specifically rejected the 
Government’s attempt to extend the third-party assumption of risk 
doctrine to this type of cell phone data, explaining that “a detailed 
chronicle of a person’s physical presence compiled every day, every 
moment, over several years,” which can be obtained through the 
acquisition of historical cell site location data, “implicates privacy 
concerns far beyond” those at issue in the Supreme Court’s previous 
                                                                                                                     
 332. See, e.g., United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 428 (4th Cir. 2016) (finding no Fourth 
Amendment search when police obtained historical cell-site location information (CSLI) from 
robbery suspects’ cell phone provider where the historical CSLI indicated which cell tower—
usually the one closest to the cell phone—transmitted a signal when the suspects used their cell 
phones to make and receive calls and texts), abrogated by United States v. Chavez, 894 F.3d 593 
(4th Cir. 2018); see also id. at 428 (recognizing that the court’s holding on the CSLI issue “accords 
with that of every other federal appellate court that has considered the Fourth Amendment 
question before us,” and further noting that “the vast majority of federal district court judges” 
have determined that no “search” occurs when police obtain historical cell site location data); In 
re Application of U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d at 615 (reaching a similar result as 
Graham). See generally Bennardo, supra note 322 (examining judicial trends in cell-site location 
tracking cases and noting that four of the five federal circuit courts that have addressed whether 
cell phone customers have a reasonable expectation of privacy in CSLI have answered in the 
negative). 
 333. See, e.g., United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 887–89 (6th Cir. 2016) (“[F]or the 
same reasons that Smith had no expectation of privacy in the numerical information at issue [in 
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979)], the defendants have no such expectation in the [CSLI] 
locational information here”), rev’d, 138 U.S. 2206 (2018); see also United States v. Davis, 785 
F.3d 498, 511–13 (11th Cir. 2015) (“[Defendant] has no objective[ly] reasonable expectation of 
privacy in MetroPCS’s business records showing the cell tower locations that wirelessly 
connected [defendant’s] calls.”). See generally Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742–44 (1979) 
(establishing, under the third-party assumption of risk doctrine, that an individual can claim “no 
legitimate expectation of privacy” in information that he has voluntarily turned over to a third 
party). 
 334. 138 S. Ct. at 2217. 
 335. Id. 
 336. Id. 
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third-party assumption of risk cases.337 The Carpenter Court further 
emphasized that, unlike the Court’s prior third-party cases, a cell phone 
user does “not truly share[]” the “trail of location data” routinely 
generated by his or her cell phone, and thus does not voluntarily assume 
the risk that such data will be compiled and transmitted to the 
government.338 
Beyond cell-site location data, an alternative method of cell phone 
tracking is to utilize the phone’s internal GPS.339 Under this method, for 
example, cell phone providers may monitor a phone’s location through 
its internal GPS and transmit that information to law enforcement 
anytime a user activates the GPS on her phone.340 Law enforcement may 
also utilize this method without the cell phone provider’s assistance.341 
Finally, smartphone apps offer location tracking or sharing services, 
including, for example, Google Maps and Snapchat, and there are various 
websites that claim to allow users to find a phone’s location.342 As such, 
there are numerous ways in which an employee’s location might be 
tracked via cell phone.  
B.  Using Cell Phone Apps to Track Employees 
Of the various methods of cell phone tracking described in the 
previous section, employers are most likely to track an employee’s cell 
                                                                                                                     
 337. See id. at 2220. 
 338. See id.  
 339. Jeremy H. Rothstein, Track Me Maybe: The Fourth Amendment and the Use of Cell 
Phone Tracking to Facilitate Arrest, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 493–94 (2012). According to 
Rothstein, all cell phones sold since 2003 are GPS-enabled, making most phones today at least 
potentially trackable. Id. at 493. However, a user can disable her phone’s GPS. Id. Moreover, 
whether a phone transmits GPS data may depend on the network and on the phone's applications. 
Id.  
 340. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 428–29 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) 
(describing this method); see also United States v. Jones, No. 2:12CR30-MEF, 2012 WL 
2568200, at *1 (M.D. Ala. June 15, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:12-CR-
030-MEF, 2012 WL 2568082 (M.D. Ala. July 3, 2012) (describing an investigation where police 
obtained a warrant to receive “pings” with the location of a suspect’s cell phone for a thirty-day 
period, after which cell phone provider Sprint sent e-mails, directly to the officer’s phone, 
containing longitudinal and latitudinal coordinates and a link to a map indicating the phone’s 
location). 
 341. See In re Application of U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 615 (5th Cir. 
2013) (refusing to “address situations where the Government surreptitiously installs spyware on 
a target’s phone or otherwise hijacks the phone’s GPS, with or without the service provider’s 
help”). 
 342. See United States v. Wheeler, 169 F. Supp 3d 896, 908 (E.D. Wis. 2016) (recognizing 
website and cell phone apps as location tracking methods); see also Brian X. Chen, When You 
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phone location through smartphone apps, including apps designed for 
human resources purposes and employers’ individual apps. Many of the 
largest employers in the United States,343 for example, have apps that can 
be downloaded from the Google Play Store that request access to a user’s 
location information upon download.344 Presumably, when a user 
consents to such data capture, the employer is capable of tracking the 
location of that user’s phone.345 
One popular timekeeping app, Humanity’s “Time Clock,” is designed 
to capture not only the times an employee is reportedly working, but also 
the location of an employee’s cell phone every time she logs in and out 
of the app.346 Every time a Time Clock user opens the app on her 
smartphone, before she can “Clock In,” she is provided the following 
message: “Please enable GPS on your device, if it’s not already turned 
ON, because it is required for clocking In and Out.”347 After the user 
clicks “Clock In,” the app reminds the user that 
“‘https://www.humanity.com’ Would Like to Use Your Current 
Location.”348 When the user clicks “Ok,” the app displays a map of the 
                                                                                                                     
 343. See Alexander E.M. Hess, The 10 Largest Employers in America, USA TODAY (Aug. 
22, 2013), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/08/22/ten-largest-employers/ 
2680249/ [https://perma.cc/F9F5-9DGR] (reporting the 10 largest American employers, 
beginning with the largest, as Walmart, Yum! Brands, Inc., McDonald’s Corp., International 
Business Machines (IBM), United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS), Target Corp., Kroger Co., Home 
Depot Inc., Hewlett-Packard Co., and General Electric Co.); see also Jennifer Calfas, The 6 
Biggest Employers in the U.S. Right Now, TIME (Apr. 27, 2017), http://time.com/ 
money/4754123/biggest-us-companies/ [https://perma.cc/5EPU-2ZUE] (reporting the five largest 
employers in the United States, beginning with the largest, as Walmart, Kroger, Home Depot, 
IBM, and McDonald’s). 
 344. On March 12, 2018, the author installed the apps of five of the largest U.S. employers 
on his Android smartphone: Walmart, Kroger, Home Depot, Target, and McDonald’s. All five of 
those apps requested to track the location of the author’s phone almost immediately upon install. 
 345. See BRUCE SCHNEIER, DATA AND GOLIATH: THE HIDDEN BATTLES TO COLLECT YOUR 
DATA AND CONTROL YOUR WORLD 3 (2015) (reporting that smartphone apps are often designed 
to permit transaction-based data collection and location tracking). See generally FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY (2014), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/data -brokers-call-transparency-
accountability-report-federal-trade-commission-may-2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5V5W-QHVM] (reporting information and findings of the FTC in a study of 
nine data brokers regarding their practices related to the collection and use of consumer data). 
 346. See Online Time Clock Software, HUMANITY (2018) https://www.humanity.com/ 
timeclock [https://perma.cc/6GB3-CCA5]. 
 347. The author’s wife, who works remotely, is required by her employer to use the 
Humanity “Time Clock” app every time she logs in to work. In March 2018, the author used the 
Time Clock app on his wife’s iPhone to complete the login process, which is accurately described 
herein. 
 348. See supra note 347. 
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phone’s nearby area and asks the user to confirm that the map accurately 
depicts her current location.349  
Because there is no trespassory invasion of an employee’s cell phone 
under these circumstances, gathering an employee’s physical location 
through an app like Time Clock will trigger Fourth Amendment 
protection only if an employee can demonstrate a legitimate expectation 
of privacy in her use of the app,350 an analysis that is fact-specific and 
based on the totality of circumstances in a given case.351 In the 
employment context, expectations of privacy often depend on whether an 
employee has been notified of and consented to the monitoring at issue.352 
Where an employee has consented to a particular form of monitoring, it 
is nearly impossible for her to expect privacy in that action.353 Moreover, 
even assuming a reasonable expectation of privacy exists, employee 
consent will impact the reasonableness of the employer’s actions under 
the second step of Fourth Amendment analysis, and may alternatively 
impact whether the employer’s action would be deemed “offensive” 
under the tort of intrusion upon seclusion.354  
These consent-based principles likely apply to timekeeping apps that 
track a user’s location, given that every time an employee logs in or out 
of apps like Time Clock, she willingly agrees to permit the tracking of 
her phone’s location. Such consent will, in turn, eliminate any privacy-
based claim the employee might assert. Coupled with the employee’s 
consent, the third-party assumption of risk doctrine would likely prevent 
                                                                                                                     
 349. See supra note 347. 
 350. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 411 (2012) (“Situations involving merely the 
transmission of electronic signals without trespass would remain subject to Katz analysis.” 
(emphasis omitted)). 
 351. As one court put it, “when a defendant takes possession of a piece of property on which 
a GPS device has already been installed, the continued monitoring of [the] device” would not be 
a “search” of that particular defendant under the trespassory test, but may constitute a “search” of 
the defendant under the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test, depending, of course, on the 
specific facts of the case. United States v. Barraza-Maldonado, 879 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1027–28 
(D. Minn. 2012), aff’d, 732 F.3d 865 (8th Cir. 2013); cf. Jones, 565 U.S. at 430 (Alito, J., 
concurring) (“The best that we can do in this case is to apply existing Fourth Amendment doctrine 
and to ask whether the use of GPS tracking in a particular case involved a degree of intrusion 
that a reasonable person would not have anticipated.” (emphasis added)). 
 352. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
 353. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
 354. City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746 (2010), illustrates the significance of consent in 
the employment context as it pertains to the Fourth Amendment’s ultimate reasonableness inquiry. 
There, in finding the search of Quon’s text messages reasonable, the Court reasoned, in part, that 
Quon had been informed his text messages were subject to auditing and thus had “received no 
assurances of privacy” in his pager messages. Id. at 761–62. This limited expectation of privacy 
“lessened the risk that the [city’s] review would intrude on highly private details of Quon’s life,” 
making it relatively unintrusive. Id. at 762–63. 
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an employee from claiming a reasonable expectation of privacy in such 
data when it has been willingly conveyed in this particular manner, as it 
would be difficult for an employee to argue that such information had not 
been voluntarily conveyed to her employer through the timekeeping app, 
which has an obvious purpose of collecting employment-related data.355 
Given this combination of consent and assumption of risk, tracking an 
employee’s location through a timekeeping app is generally not 
unlawful.356  
Finally, because wholesale employee tracking for timekeeping 
purposes replaces traditional methods of clocking in and clocking out that 
have been used for decades, it constitutes a form of tracking for non-
investigatory, work-related purposes, for which employers are provided 
great latitude. In discussing such non-investigatory searches, the Court in 
O’Connor declared that public employers should be afforded “wide 
latitude” to conduct such searches for “work-related, noninvestigatory 
reasons” in order “[t]o ensure the efficient and proper operation of the 
agency.”357 Accordingly, when employee tracking is performed for a 
“work-related” purpose, particularly when it is done to improve the 
efficiency of operations—as is the case with most time-keeping apps—
the “wide latitude” that must be afforded employers would seemingly 
justify an across-the-board monitoring of employees’ locations.  
Although tracking an employee’s location through a timekeeping app 
is generally not unlawful, the analysis may change somewhat with respect 
to location tracking via an employer’s individual app. This is because, 
unlike apps designed specifically for timekeeping purposes, such broad-
based employer apps generally do not distinguish between on-duty and 
off-duty activity, making them more invasive of privacy.358  
This leaves only the scenario of tracking an individual employee via 
cell phone in the context of a workplace misconduct investigation. On 
                                                                                                                     
 355. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (“This Court consistently has held 
that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to 
third parties.”). For timekeeping apps in particular, the obvious connection between the app’s 
employment-related function and the data generated by the app, including the phone’s location 
information, should distinguish the case from Carpenter v. United States, which involved a far 
more comprehensive and “exhaustive chronicle of location information casually collected by 
wireless carriers” for a much more general business purpose. See 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219–20 (2018). 
When an employer utilizes other apps to track an employee’s location in this manner, such as an 
employer’s general app that anyone, including employees and customers, can access, the 
assumption of risk argument carries less force. 
 356. Cf. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2222 (“We hold only that a warrant is required in the rare 
case where the suspect has a legitimate privacy interest in records held by a third party.”). 
 357. O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 723 (1987). 
 358. Cf. supra notes 292–319 and accompanying text (emphasizing that GPS tracking by an 
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this issue, it is difficult to imagine an employer using any method of cell 
phone tracking only with respect to a particular employee. Accordingly, 
where cell phone location data is used in the context of an employee 
misconduct investigation, it would likely be in the manner used in 
Carniol—that is, where the employer simply reviews a batch of data it 
had previously collected on a widescale basis, with employee consent, for 
legitimate business reasons.359 And, as in Carniol, because such data 
would have been lawfully acquired, possessed, and owned by the 
employer, nothing would prevent the employer from reviewing its data 
to determine whether a particular employee engaged in misconduct, in 
which case disciplinary proceedings may commence despite any Fourth 
Amendment challenge.360  
CONCLUSION 
This Article has examined the tracking of employees through both 
GPS and smartphones, conduct that may cause disgruntled employees to 
sue for an invasion of privacy. Employers will have a much stronger 
defense against such claims when they use either tracking method to 
monitor an entire segment of employees for legitimate business reasons, 
rather than as part of an investigation into individual employee 
malfeasance. In addition, notifying employees in advance of any 
surveillance program, such as through a written GPS tracking policy, and 
limiting the scope of any surveillance to avoid collecting data regarding 
employees’ off duty conduct, will help avoid liability for such claims. 
 
                                                                                                                     
 359. See supra notes 292–319 and accompanying text. 
 360. See supra notes 318–19 and accompanying text. 
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